• The first half of the fifteenth century witnessed political instability with the
  disintegration of the Tughluq dynasty. Both the Saiyyad (1414-1451) and the Lodi (1451-1526) rulers failed to cope with the disruptive forces.
• The nobles resented and rebelled at the earliest opportunity. The political chaos in the North-West provinces had weakened the centre.
• In Central India there were three kingdoms: Gujarat, Malwa and Mewar.
  • The power of Sultan Mahmud Khalji II of Malwa was on the decline.
  • Gujarat was ruled by Muzaffar Shah II.
  • Mewar under the leadership of Sisodia ruler Rana Sanga was the most powerful kingdom.
    • Rana Sanga had established his control over eastern Malwa, and was in competition with the Lodis for control over eastern Rajasthan and the rest of Malwa.
  • Rulers of Malwa were under constant pressure of the Lodis, Mewar and Gujarat. This was because:
    • It was the most fertile region and an important source for elephant supply.
    • It provided an important trade route to Gujarat sea-ports.
    • For both Gujarat and Mewar it could serve as a buffer against the Lodis.
  • The Sultan of Malwa was an incompetent ruler, and his prime minister Medini Rai could hardly hold the kingdom intact for long in the wake of internal strifes.
  • Finally, Rana Sanga, succeeded in extending his influence over Malwa and Gujarat.
  • By the close of the 15th century, Rana Sanga’s sway over Rajputana became almost complete with the occupation of Ranthambhor and Chanderi.
• In south, there were powerful Vijaynagar and Bahmani kingdoms.
• Towards the east, Nusrat Shah ruled Bengal.
• Towards the closing years of Ibrahim Lodi’s reign, Afghan chieftains Nasir Khan Lohani, Ma’ruf Farmuli, etc. succeeded in carving out separate kingdom of Jaunpur under Sultan Muhammad Shah.
• Besides these major powers, there were numerous Afghan chieftaincies around Agra like Hasan Khan in Mewat, Nizam Khan in Bayana etc.
• While analysing the political set-up on the eve of Babur’s invasion it is generally said that there was confederacy of Rajput principalities which was ready to seize the control of Hindustan.
  • It is held that had Babur not intervened, the Rajputs led by their illustrious leader Rana Sanga would have captured power in northern India.
  • It is argued that the political division of the regional states was religious in nature and that Rajput confederacy under Rana Sanga fired by religious zeal wanted to establish a Hindu Empire.
  • This assumption is based on the famous passage of Baburnama where Babur says that Hindustan was governed by ‘five Musalman rulers’:
    • the Lodis (at the centre), Gujarat, Malwa, Bahmani, and Bengal, and two ‘pagans’ (Rana Sanga of Mewar and Vijaynagar).
  • Besides, the fathnama issued after the battle of Khanwa suggests that Rajput confederacy under Rana was inspired by religious zeal and organised with the intention to overthrow the “Islamic power”.
  • However, such observations have been questioned by historians.
    • Babur has nowhere suggested that these powers were antagonistic against each other on religious grounds.
    • Instead, Babur himself admits that many rais and ranas were obedient to Islam.
    • Moreover, in the composition of the confederacy, there were many Muslim chieftains like Hasan Khan Mewati, Mahumud Khan Lodi, etc. who side with Rana Sanga against Babur.
    • In fact, it was not Rana Sanga, but Sultan Mahmud who proclaimed himself the king of Delhi.
    • Though, the power of Rana was unquestionable, Babur was more anxious of Afghan menace: thus the theory of religious consideration does not seem to hold ground.
• In the period between 1517 and 1519, two apparently unconnected events took place which profoundly affected the history of India.
  • The death of the Afghan ruler, Sikandar Lodi, at Agra towards the end of 1517 and the succession of Ibrahim Lodi.
  • The conquest of Bajaur and Bhira, by Babur in the frontier tract of north-west Punjab in the beginning of 1519.

Foundation of Mughal rule in India

• Much before the final showdown at the battle of Panipat (1526), Babur had invaded India four times. These skirmishes were trials of strength of Mughal arms and Lodi forces.
  • The first to fall was fort of Bhira (1519-1520), the gateway of Hindustan (situated on the river Jhelum),
  • followed by Sialkot (1520) and Lahore (1524).
• He put forward a vague claim that the areas which had once belonged to Timur be surrendered to him, and despatched an envoy to Ibrahim Lodi for the purpose.
• The governor of Lahore at that time was Daulat Khan Lodi.
  • He sent his son, Dilawar Khan, to Babur at Kabul in 1521-22. He invited Babur to invade India since, he said, the ruler, Ibrahim Lodi, was a tyrant. He asserted that he had been sent to Babur by many nobles who were ready to obey.
• Babur also received an envoy from Rana Sanga who, according to Babur, proposed that while Babur attacked Delhi, Sanga would attack Agra.
• Motives of invitation:
  • They apparently expected Babur to withdraw, like Timur, after setting up a titular ruler at Delhi who would be weak and would depend on him.
  • They hoped this would enable them to continue to rule as before, and extend their control over the areas they coveted.
• The arrival of these envoys convinced him that the situation was ripe for undertaking the conquest of India.

First Battle of Panipat (20 April,1526):

• In preparation of the conflict, Babur had consolidated his position in Afghanistan by capturing Balkh from the Uzbeks.
  • He had also captured Qandahar. Thus, having secured his rear and flank, in November 1525, Babur marched from Kabul for the conquest of Hindustan.
• Marching by way of Sialkot which yielded to him without opposition, Babur reached Lahore which was being besieged by Daulat Khan Lodi and his son, Ghazi Khan. At Babur’s approach, their army melted away.
• Having conquered Punjab, Babur moved slowly towards Delhi.
  • Ibrahim Lodi made no move to contest Babur’s position in Punjab.
• Babur learnt that Ibrahim was advancing leisurely, marching two or four miles, and stopping at each camp for two to three days.
• Ibrahim Lodi had not carefully studied Babur’s defensive formation even though the two armies stood face to face for almost a week, and daily skirmishes went on.
• Finally, Ibrahim Lodi and Babur’s forces met at the historic battlefield of Panipat. The battle lasted for just few hours in favour of Babur.
• The battle shows Babur’s skill in the art of warfare.
  • His soldiers were less in number but the organisation was superior.
  • Babur placed Ibrahim’s army at 100,000 and 1000 elephants. According to Afghan sources, the effective strength of Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat was 50,000. On the other hand Babur had only 12,000 horseman.
  • The battle proved to be a triumph of generalship over numbers.
  • Considering that Ibrahim Lodi’s army was much larger than his own, and in order to avoid being surrounded by it, Babur chose the ground carefully.
    • He protected his right by resting it on the city of Panipat, and on the left, dug a ditch with branches of felled trees so that the cavalry could not cross it.
    • In front, he put together 700 carts. These carts were joined together by ropes of raw hide, and between every two carts short breastworks were put up behind which matchlockmen could stand and fire.
  • Babur calls this method of stringing carts the Ottoman (Rumi) devise because, along with cannons it had been used by the Ottoman Sultan.
  • This was a very strong defensive as well as offensive arrangement. Babur had a very poor opinion of Ibrahim Lodi as a strategist.
    • He says, “he was an unproved brave; he provided nothing for his military operations, he perfected nothing, nor knew how to stand, nor move, nor fight.”
• Babur successfully applied the Rumi (Ottoman) method of warfare
  • The Afghans, greater in number, were unable to move forward nor backward.
  • Babur sent his two flanking parties (tulghuma) to wheel around in the Uzbek fashion, and attack Ibrahim’s army from the both sides and rear.
  • From the front, Babur’s cavalrymen shot off arrows, and his matchlockmen poured a deadly fire on the huddled mass of Afghans.
    • Babur had hired two Ottoman gunners, Ustad Ali and Mustafa, and appointed Ustad Ali as master of ordnance. Babur says that Ustad Ali and Mustafa made good discharge of field cannons from the centre.
• Afghan army was completely paralyzed.
  • Surrounded from all sides, Ibrahim Lodi fought on bravely and died fighting. Babur paid a tribute to his  bravery by burying him on the spot with honour.
  • Afghan casualties reported by Babur were approximately 20,000.
  • Vikramajit, the ruler of Gwaliyar, was among those who died fighting in the battle.
• In the battle it was not Babur’s artillery but his ‘superb tactics‘ and the ‘mounted archers‘ and cavalry played the decisive role, as acknowledged by Babur.
• Significance of the battle of Panipat:
  • The battle of Panipat was undoubtedly one of the decisive battles of Indian history.
  • It smashed the power of the Lodis, and opened up the entire territory upto Jaunpur to Babur’s control.
  • The rich treasures stored by the Lodi Sultans at Agra relieved Babur of his financial difficulties.
  • However, the battle of Panipat, though, formally established the Mughal rule in India, it was first among the series of battles in the years to come before he could consolidate his position.
    • For example, to secure this triumph, it was equally important to overcome Rana Sanga of Mewar and the chieftains in and around Delhi and Agra.
    • Another important opponent in the eastern India was the Afghans.
    • To add to this, problems were mounting within his own nobility.
    • Thus, politically the battle of Panipat was not as decisive as it was militarily.
  • However, it marks a new phase in the struggle for the establishment of a hegemonic political power in north India.

Babur and the Rajput Kingdoms:

• Rana Sanga of Mewar was a power to reckon with.
• Babur, in his Memoir, has blamed Rana Sanga for breaking his promise by not siding with him in the battle of Panipat against Ibrahim Lodi.
  • There was some understanding on both sides to join hands against Ibrahim Lodi in which the Rana faltered.
• Rana expected Babur to return to Kabul and leave him free to establish his hegemony.
  • Babur’s decision to stay back must have given a big jolt to Rana’s ambitions.
  • Babur was also fully aware of the fact that it would be impossible for him to consolidate his position in India unless he shattered the Rana’s power.
• Rana Sanga this time succeeded in establishing the confederacy against Babur with the help of Afghan nobles.
  • The Rana was joined by almost all the leading Rajput Rajas from Rajasthan — such as Harauti, Jalor, Sirohi and Dungarpur from South and West Rajasthan, and Dhundhar and Amber from the east.
    • Rao Medini Rao of Chanderi in Malwa also joined.
  • Mahmud Lodi, the younger son of Sikandar Lodi, also joined whom the Afghans had proclaimed their Sultan.
  • Hasan Khan Mewati of Mewat not only joined the Rana but also played a crucial role in forming the confederacy.
  • Several other Afghans joined Rana.
  • Husain Khan Nuhani occupied Rapri, Rustam Khan prevailed over Koil, while Qutub Khan captured Chandawar.
  • Pressure of eastern Afghans was so much that Sultan Muhammad Duldai had to leave Qannauj and join Babur.
  • To add to this, the defeat of Babur’s commander Abdul Aziz and Muhibb Ali at Bayana and their praise of the valour of the Rajput army completely demoralised Babur’s army.
• Ferishta and Badauni (Akbar’s contemporary) comment that “the sense of defeatism was so strong that it was proposed by a majority at a council of war that the Padshah should withdraw to Punjab.
  • The Baburnama does not say anything about such a proposal, but this shows the general feeling of despair and frustration.
  • However, Babur prevailed over the situation with his fiery speech touching the religious sentiments of his men.
    • He declared the war against the Rana to be a jihad or holy war.
    • Babur also renounced wine, breaking flasks of choice Ghazni wine. He also promised to remit the tamgha (toll) on all Muslims if he gained a victory over the Rana.
    • Babur denounces the Afghans who opposed him as kafirs and mulhids. This shows that these words were often used in a political as well as a religious sense.
    • After the battle of Khanwa, Babur assumed the title of ghazi.
  • Sanga represented a Rajput-Afghan alliance, the proclaimed objective of which was to expel Babur, and to restore the Lodi empire.
    • Hence, the battle at Khanua can hardly be seen as a religious conflict between Hindus and Muslims, or even as a Rajput bid to establish a Rajput hegemony over North India.
• Battle of Khanwa (16 March, 1527):
  • Babur fortified his position near Sikri at the village Khanwa. Here also he planned and organised his army on the ‘Ottoman’ lines.
  • This time he took the support of a tank on his left, front side again was defended by carts but ropes were replaced by iron chains.
  • However, this time he used the strong wooden tripods connected with each other by ropes. They offered not only protection and rest to the guns but also they could move them forward and backward on the wheels.
  • It took around 20-25 days to complete the strategy under Ustad Mustafa and Ustad Ali.
  • In the battle (17th March, 1527) Babur made use of his artillery well.
  • Rana Sanga got severely wounded and was carried to Baswa near Amber. Hasan Khan Mewati was killed. The Rajputs suffered a big loss.
  • It was irrational for Rana to remain inactive for over three weeks. This provided an opportunity to Babur to strengthen himself and prepare for war.
  • Babur’s disciplined army, mobile cavalry and his artillery played most decisive role in the battle.
  • Khanua completed to battle of Panipat, and Babur’s position in the Gangetic doab was made largely secure.
• Battle of Chanderi:
  • Though the Mewar Rajputs received a great shock at Khanwa, Medini Rai at Malwa was still a power to reckon with.
  • In 1520 Rana Sanga had bestowed Malwa on Medini Rai, the chief noble of Mahmud II of Malwa. In spite of great vaisur with which the Rajputs fought at Chanderi (1528), Babur faced little difficulty in overcoming Medini Rai.
  • With his defeat, resistance across Rajputana was shattered. But Babur had to tackle the Afghans.

Babur and the Afghan Chieftains:

• The Afghans had surrendered Delhi, but they were still powerful in the east (Bihar and parts of Jaunpur) where the Nuhani Afghans were dominant led by Sultan Muhammad Nuhani.
• The Afghans of Chunar, Jaunpur and Awadh were not ready to cooperate with the Nuhanis in a bid to give a united opposition against the Mughals. Instead, they surrendered meekly to Humayun (1527).
• In the meantime Sultan Muhammad Nuhani died (1528) and left the Nuhanis disjointed as his son Jalal Khan was still a minor.
• But the vacuum was soon filled by the appearance of Prince Mahmud Lodi, son of Sikandar Lodi and brother of Ibrahim.
• The Afghans, including the non-Nuhanis, who were a little hesitant earlier to side with the Nuhanis, now readily accepted Mahmud’s leadership.
• Besides, several Nuhani Afghans who felt leaderless with the desertion of Jalal to Bengal, welcomed Mahmud.
• Nusrat Shah of Bengal also, though apparently advocated friendship with Babur, secretly adopted hostile measures against him.
  • He considered the existence of the Nuhani kingdom in Bihar as buffer between the Mughals and his own possessions in parts of Bihar.
• Babur could hardly afford to ignore these developments.
  • He mobilized his forces at Ghagra and inflicted a crushing defeat upon Nusrat Shah’s army (1529).
  • Thus ended the Afghan-Nusrat coalition and Nusrat Shah had to surrender large number of Afghan rebels who had taken asylum in his territory.
  • The Afghans were now totally demoralized.
• Thus, within four years Babur succeeded in crushing the hostile powers and now could think of consolidating himself at Delhi. But he could hardly get the opportunity to rule as he died soon after (29 December, 1530).
• The establishment of the Mughal Empire under the aegis of Babur was significant. Though the Afghans and Rajputs could not be crushed completely, a task left to his successors, his two major blows at Panipat and Khanwa were certainly decisive and destroyed the balance of power in the region and perhaps was a step towards the establishment of an all-India empire.