Nationalism- State-building in Germany: Part III

Bismarck

• Early career:
  • Born in 1815, he belonged to old landed aristocracy of Prussia. selfstudyhistory.com
  • In university he had high spirit and disregarded for any discipline.
  • He joined Prussian Civil Service on its judicial side but resigned and busied himself with the management of his family estate.
  • In 1847, he made his debut in politics as a member of United Prussian Diet which was summoned by Frederick William IV.
• His attitude towards movements:
  • He was anti-revolutionary, denounced democracy and liberalism and defended the cause of Prussian monarchy.
  • He was against any plan which was likely to merge Prussia in Germany or would commit Prussian monarchy to a policy of compromise with democracy or constitutionalism.
  • He supported the refusal of King to accept Frankfort crown and even approved of the Austrian triumph at Olmutz.
  • His ultra-royalist policy was rewarded by his appointment as Prussian representative at the Federal Diet at Frankfurt in 1851.
• Bismarck at Frankfurt:
  • In the period of 8 years as a Prussian representative at Federal Diet,, he studied and practiced the art of diplomacy, gained larger view of problems confronted by Prussia, came to know about intentions of Austria so developed strong anti-Austrian sentiment. He came to the conclusion that Germany is too narrow for Austria and Prussia.
  • He realised that the fundamental problem of German question was the expulsion of Austria and attitude of smaller German states.
• Bismarck as ambassador to Russia and France:
  • His attitude soon became too bold and independent for William IV who wished to continue on good terms with Austria and so he was transferred to Saint Petersburg.
  • As Prussian ambassador to Russia, he secured good will of the Tsar which was of invaluable help to Prussia later on.
  • Next for a short time, he was ambassador to France where he secured accurate insight into the complexities of the character of Napoleon.
  • In 1862, he was summoned to Berlin to head the ministry.
• Bismarck as Minister-President of Prussia:
  • His aim and policy:
    • He thought that a powerful army was essential to the role which Prussia to play in unification of Germany.
    • He looked at the constitutional conflict in Prussia as a part of the larger problem which was to be settled abroad by war and diplomacy.
    • He realised that victory of Parliament would be fatal and progressives i.e. liberals would not support his ambitious schemes. Hence he entered into conflict with Parliament, determined to carry out scheme of army reform.
    • Bismarck announces his policy of Blood and Iron:
      • He declared that Germany was looking not to Prussia’s liberalism but to his power and said “not by speeches and resolutions of the majorities are the great questions of the day to be decided but by Blood and Iron.”
      • He had clear views that Germany must be united but only under leadership of Prussia. (a Prussianised Germany)
      • But Prussia would never be able to assume the leadership of Germany so long as there was Austria, hence Austria must go and she would not go voluntarily. War was necessary.
    • He overrides the Constitution and carries out army reform:
      • For 4 years, he had to struggle against majority in parliament but he rode rough shod over the Constitution.
      • He continued to levy and collect taxes without Parliamentary grant and fully carried out the military reforms.
      • Due to unconstitutional procedures, he came to be bitterly hated by liberals.
  • Bismarck’s diplomatic preparations:
    • Foreign policy:
      • He tried to isolate Austria.
      • He began by quoting the friendship of Napoleon III, the recent enemy of Austria and concluded a commercial treaty of France, giving her favourable terms.
      • In 1863, he took the advantage of revolt in Russian Poland to win good will of Tsar.
        • The feeling in Germany was on the side of Poles and great powers (England, France and Austria) sympathised with Poles.
        • But Bismarck offered help to Tsar in suppressing Polish revolt and this masterstroke secured to Prussia the good will of Tsar and Austria lost it by her pro-Polished attitude.
    • He frustrates Austria’s attempt at Federal reform:
      • He persuaded the King William not to attend the Congress of Princes summoned by Austria in 1863 for the reform of German Confederation as it might strengthened Austrian position in Germany.
      • It ruined all hopes of reform by which Austria had sought to consolidate her leadership of Germany.

Bismarck and Realpolitik

• Bismarck, Roon and Moltke took charge at a time when relations among the Great Powers—Great Britain, France, Austria and Russia—had been shattered by the Crimean War of 1854–55 and the Italian War of 1859.
  • In the aftermath of this disarray, the convergence of von Moltke’s operational redesign, von Roon’s army restructure, and Bismarck’s diplomacy influenced the realignment of the European balance of power.
  • Their combined agendas established Prussia as the leading German power through a combination of foreign diplomatic triumphs — backed up by the possible use of Prussian military might — and an internal conservativism tempered by pragmatism, which came to be known as Realpolitik.
• Realpolitik:
  • It is politics or diplomacy based primarily on considerations of power and on practical and material factors, rather than explicit ideological notions or moral or ethical premises.
  • In this respect, it shares aspects of its philosophical approach with those of realism and pragmatism.
• Bismarck expressed the essence of Realpolitik in his subsequently famous “Blood and Iron” speech to the Budget Committee of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies on 30 September 1862, shortly after he became Minister President:
  • “Prussia must concentrate and maintain its power for the favorable moment which has already slipped by several times. Prussia’s boundaries according to the Vienna treaties are not favorable to a healthy state life. The great questions of the time will not be resolved by speeches and majority decisions—that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood.”
• Although Bismarck was an outstanding diplomat, the phrase “blood and iron” has become a popular description of his foreign policy partly because he did on occasion resort to war in a highly effective manner to aid in the unification of Germany and the expansion of its continental power.
• By 1862, when Bismarck made his speech, the idea of a German nation-state in the peaceful spirit of Pan-Germanism had shifted from the liberal and democratic character of 1848 to accommodate Bismarck’s more conservative Realpolitik.
• Bismarck’s words, “iron and blood“, have often been misappropriated as evidence of a German lust for blood and power.
  • His emphasis on blood and iron did not always imply simply the unrivaled military might of the Prussian army but rather two important aspects: the ability of the assorted German states to produce iron and other related war materials and the willingness to use those war materials if necessary.
• While the conditions of the treaties binding the various German states to one another prohibited Bismarck from taking unilateral action, the politician and diplomat in him realized the impracticality of such an action. In order to get the German states to unify, Bismarck needed a single, outside enemy that would declare war on one of the German states first, thus providing a cause to rally all Germans behind.
• Bismarck was neither villain nor saint: by manipulating events of 1866 and 1870, he demonstrated the political and diplomatic skill.
• Three episodes proved fundamental to the administrative and political unification of Germany.
  • First, the death without male heirs of Frederick VII of Denmark led to the Second War of Schleswig in 1864.
  • Second, the unification of Italy provided Prussia an ally against Austria in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.
  • Finally, France — fearing Hohenzollern encirclement — declared war on Prussia in 1870, resulting in the Franco-Prussian War.
• Through a combination of Bismarck’s diplomacy and political leadership, von Roon’s military reorganization, and von Moltke’s military strategy, Prussia demonstrated that none of the European signatories of the 1815 peace treaty could guarantee Austria’s sphere of influence in Central Europe, thus achieving Prussian hegemony in Germany and ending the dualism debate.
• Was German unification achieved more by ‘coal and iron’ than by ‘blood and iron’?
  • Prussian Prime Minister and great diplomat had once said that the unification of Germany would to achieved through ‘blood and iron’.
  • The great British economist of 20th century John Maynard Keynes had observed that the German Empire was not founded on ‘blood and iron’ but on ‘coal and iron’.
  • ‘Coal and iron’ refers to economic ties and economic strength unifying Germany and ‘blood and iron’ refers to the unification of Germany through force.
  • German unification was achieved through ‘coal and iron’ because:
    • Adopting free trade, the same currency, weights and measures allowed more cooperation between German states who became member of the Prussian Customs Union (Zollverein) increased their dependence on each other.
    • Zollverein strove to protect German business from foreign influence by introducing tariffs on raw materials.
    • These tariffs coupled with free trade inside the union meant wider markets for home-produced goods at cheaper prices.
    • This broke down regional barriers and rivalry between German states shifting the emphasis from pride in one’s state to pride in a greater entity, a greater Germany.
    • As Zollverein was founded and ran by Prussia it firmly established her as the economic leader in Germany and many states also regarded Prussia as the natural leader of a united Germany.
    • The Zollverein also a political effect in isolating Austria who was at the time had larger possibility to be the leader of unified Germany.
      • By 1851 all the states had joined the Zollverein and only Austria was left out.
      • This increased Prussian power in the confederation and paved the way for German unification under Prussia.
      • This indicates that even before the appointment of Bismarck, Prussian leadership was successful in stimulating the economy.
    • Economic forces like the Zollverein shifted power from individual rulers of states to the middle classes who realised power and money could be gained from unification.
    • Blood and Iron policy of Bismarck lay in Prussia’s military strength which would not have been possible without her economic strength (i.e. ‘coal and iron’) providing resources and technology for military.
    • Due to expansion of communication system like railways between the states increased greatly and now not only were economic barriers broken down but also physical ones.
      • The railways helped with the spread of German press.
      • Now state news would become a national affair.
    • Keynes argued that the industrial and economic preparation before the wars, which united Germany, were more important.
      • This is because the economic strength created by the rapid industrialisation enabled the creation of a powerful Prussia.
      • It was under this powerful Prussia, with some skillful diplomacy and opportunism by Bismarck, that Germany was successfully united in the wars of German Unification.
  • German unification was achieved through ‘blood and iron’ because:
    • The role of Bismarck in the unification of Germany was a key factor.
    • There were attempted unification through ‘coal and iron’. Bismarck realised that economy was not going to unify Germany so he used force to achieve this.
    • Attempt to unify Germany failed in 1848 and 1851 which showed that economy was still not enough.
    • Even though the states were economically unified under Prussia through the Zollverein they still turned to Austria when it came to political matters.
    • Bismarck realised that however much Germany was economically unified, it would take a lot more to unite them politically under Prussia.
      • Bismarck adopted method of ‘blood and iron’ and he waged three wars with Denmark, Austria and France, before German unification was achieved.
      • Second war (The Battle of Sadowa, 1866) was with Austria in which Austria was badly defeated and Prussia now gained political dominance as she was to dictate the terms of the peace treaty. This treaty abolished the Bundstag and Austria was excluded from the North German Confederation.
      • War with France (The Battle of Sedan, 1870) completed the German unification.
  • Conclusion:
    • The base for German unification was prepared by ‘coal and iron’ on which Bismarck policy of ‘blood and iron’ built upon.
    • Hence, both had played its role in the unification with different degree of impact at different time.

Crimean war helped in German Unification

• (More about Crimean War in different chapter)
• The Crimea War led to an important regrouping of Powers, which made the unification of Germany possible.
• During war, Austria’s hostile neutrality had irritated Russia who had saved Austrian Empire from dissolution during Hungarian revolt of 1848-49. The result was that old alliance of the three despotic powers (Russia, Austria and Prussia) which was the cornerstone of Metternich’s policy which till now had saved the Austrian Empire from disruption, was now broken.
• Furious at Austrian ingratitude Russia turned to Prussia whose friendly neutrality she appreciated. The state of things led to a new regrouping of Powers which gave rise to important developments afterwards.
• Bismarck took advantage of Russia’s estrangement from Austria and began to court the friendship of the Czar in order to further his project of ousting Austria from Germany.
  • The result was that Austria was completely isolated during the Austro-Prussian War that followed, Russia remaining neutral as Austria had done.
  • Austria was defeated and the German Empire (after unification of Germany) that Prussia subsequently built up was largely based upon Russian neutrality.

The Schleswig-Holstein Question

• The first episode in the saga of German unification under Bismarck came with the Schleswig-Holstein Question.
• Schleswig-Holstein question was controversy between Denmark, Prussia, and Austria over the status of Schleswig and Holstein.
• At this time the population of Schleswig was Danish in its northern portion, German in the south, and mixed in the northern towns and centre. The population of Holstein was almost entirely German.
• The duchy of Schleswig was a dependency of Denmark in the 13th and 14th centuries, but from 1386 to 1460 it was united with Holstein.
• After 1474 both Schleswig and Holstein were ruled as separate duchies by the kings of Denmark, although Holstein also remained a fief of the Holy Roman Empire and, later, from 1815, a member of the German Confederation.
• The Napoleonic Wars awakened German national feeling, and the political bonds that had existed between Schleswig and Holstein suggested that the two regions should form a single state within the German Confederation.
• A counter-movement developed among the Danish population in northern Schleswig and from 1838 in Denmark itself, where the Liberals insisted that Schleswig had belonged to Denmark for centuries and that the frontier between Germany and Denmark had to be the Eider River (which had historically marked the border between Schleswig and Holstein).
• The Danish nationalists thus hoped to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark, in the process detaching it from Holstein.
• German nationalists conversely sought to confirm Schleswig’s association with Holstein, in the process detaching the former from Denmark.
• On 15 November 1863, King Christian IX of Denmark became king of Denmark and duke of Schleswig and Holstein. Schleswig was a fief of Denmark while Holstein was a member of German confederation, but the two duchies were regarded as indissolubly linked together.
• These differences led in March 1848 to an open uprising by Schleswig-Holstein’s German majority in support of independence from Denmark and close association with the German Confederation.
  • The uprising was helped by the military intervention of Prussia, whose army drove Denmark’s troops from Schleswig-Holstein.
  • The Duke of Augustenburg who had strong claim upon the duchies also resisted Danish attempt.
• This war between Denmark and Prussia lasted three years (1848–50) and ended only when the Great Powers pressured Prussia into accepting the London Protocol of 1852.
  • Under the terms of this peace agreement, the German Confederation returned Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark.
  • In an agreement with Prussia under the 1852 protocol, the Danish government in return undertook not to tie Schleswig more closely to Denmark than to its sister duchy of Holstein.
• In 1863, nevertheless, the Liberal government prevailed on the new Danish king, Christian IX, to sign a new joint constitution for Denmark and Schleswig.
  • On 18 November 1863, Christian IX signed the Danish November Constitution and declared the Duchy of Schleswig a part of Denmark.
  • The German Confederation saw this act as a violation of the London Protocol of 1852, which emphasized the status of the kingdom of Denmark as distinct from the independent duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.
  • Prussia and Austria were now able to intervene as the upholders of the 1852 protocol.
  • The German Confederation could use the ethnicities of these duchies as a rallying cry: large portions of both Schleswig and Holstein were of German origin and spoke German in everyday life (though Schleswig had a sizable Danish population).
  • The Duke of Augustenburg also revive his claim and offered himself to put as a head against Denmark Resistance.
• Bismarck exploited the situation:
  • He wanted that the duchies should go neither to Denmark nor to The Duke of Augustenburg whose claim Federal Diet supported, but to Prussia.
  • His first move was to use Austria as an ally in order to act jointly against Denmark. If he had acted alone he might have faced opposition of the Federal Diet of which Austria was the President. It was agreed that Austria and Prussia should settle the matter without interference of the Diet.
  • In the ensuing German-Danish War (1864), Danish military resistance was crushed by Prussia and Austria. By the Peace of Vienna (October 1864), Christian IX ceded Schleswig and Holstein to Austria and Prussia.
  • Quarrel over the disposition of the two duchies:
    • Bismarck began to put obstacles in the way of the Austrian proposal that the duchies should be handed over to the Duke of Augustenburg.
    • To ease the tensions, the Prussian minister-president Bismarck met with the Austrian envoy Blome at Gastein in the Austrian Alps.
    • Gastein Convention:
      • Convention of Gastein was agreement between Austria and Prussia reached on Aug. 20, 1865, after their seizure of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark.
      • It temporarily postponed the final struggle between them for hegemony over Germany.
      • The pact provided that both the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia were to be sovereign over the duchies, Prussia administering Schleswig and Austria administering Holstein (which was sandwiched between Schleswig to the north and Prussian territory to the south).
      • Both duchies were to be admitted to the Zollverein (German Customs Union), headed by Prussia, though Austria was not a member. Also the question of the duchies was not to be brought before Diet.
      • This convention was a great diplomatic triumph for Bismarck.
        • It put down claim of the Duke of Augustenburg,
        • included duchies into Zollverein and
        • Austria administering Holstein was sandwiched between Schleswig to the north and Prussian territory to the south which made it difficult for Austria to rule.
      • Though Prussia benefited from the treaty, Bismarck noticed that it did not answer the German question nor did it ease the Austria–Prussia rivalry.
      • Moreover the treaty ran counter to the legal basis of the German Confederation, which led to the refusal both by the smaller Confederation states and the European powers; it was nevertheless appreciated by Russia in view of her enmity with Austria after the Crimean War.

Seven Weeks’ War or Austro-prussian War (1866)

• The Gastein Convention was highly disadvantage to Austria and so was not likely to last long. As Bismarck himself said, it merely “papered over the cracks”, and that was exactly what Bismarck wanted. War with Austria was necessary for the fulfillment of his great design of unification of Germany under Prussian leadership.
• The Gastein Convention soon collapsed due to Bismarck’s efforts to provoke a war with Austria as well as to eliminate Austria from the German Confederation. These efforts led to the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War, also known as the Seven Weeks’ War, in June 1866.
• Austria had no intention of keeping Holstein which was sandwiched in between Prussian territory.
  • On 1 June 1866 she asked the Federal Convention for a resolution on the status of Holstein, which Prussia regarded as a breach of the mutual agreement.
  • Bismarck used this as an excuse to start a war with Austria by accusing them of violating the Gastein Convention. Bismarck sent Prussian troops to occupy Holstein and expelled Austrians.
• But it was not enough for Bismarck to only provoke Austria to war.
  • It was necessary that cause of war should involve the whole German question. So he proposed the reform of German confederation on the basis of universal suffrage, with Austria excluded.
  • He thus made Prussia appear not merely as an aggrieved party in regard to Shlesweig-Holstein question, but as the champion of national unification.
  • Austria naturally turned down Prussian proposal of reform and prevailed upon Diet to mobilise federal troops against Prussia to punish Prussia for the infraction of Austrian region in Holstein.
  • Prussia therefore seceded from the confederation and declared war upon Austria appearing to take up arms in self defence. This war is called Seven Weeks War.
• The timing of the declaration was perfect, because:
  • Bismarck made an alliance with Italy, committing it to the war if Prussia entered one against Austria within three months, which was an obvious incentive for Bismarck to go to war with Austria within three months to divert Austrian strength away from Prussia.
  • All other European powers were either bound by alliances that forbade them from entering the conflict, or had domestic problems that had priority.
  • Britain had no stake economically or politically in war between Prussia and Austria.
  • Russia was unlikely to enter on the side of Austria, due to ill will over Austrian support of the anti-Russian alliance during the Crimean War and Prussia had stood by Russia during the January Uprising in Poland whereas Austria had not.
  • France was also unlikely to enter on the side of Austria, because Bismarck and Napoleon III met in Biarritz and allegedly discussed whether or not France would intervene in a potential Austro-Prussian war. The details of the discussion are unknown but many historians think that Bismarck was guaranteed French neutrality in the event of a war.
  • Italy was already allied with Prussia, which meant that Austria would be fighting both with no major allies of its own.
• Bismarck may well have been encouraged to go to war by the advantages of the Prussian army against the Austrian Empire.
  • Although several German states initially sided with Austria, they stayed on the defensive and failed to take effective initiatives against Prussian troops.
  • The Austrian army therefore faced the technologically superior Prussian army with support only from Saxony.
  • France promised aid, but it came late and was insufficient.
  • By the alliance with Italy, Bismarck contrived to divert part of the Austrian forces to the south in Venetia and on the Adriatic sea. This advantage, together with that of Prussia’s modernized army discipline, resulted in a Prussian victory.
• Battle of Sadowa:
  • A quick decisive victory was essential to keep other powers like France or Russia from entering the conflict on Austria’s side. Austria had already appealed to Napoleon III for help.
  • The day-long Battle of Koniggratz or Sadova gave Prussia an uncontested and decisive victory.
  • In order to forestall intervention by France or Russia, Bismarck pushed King William I of Prussia to make peace with the Austrians rapidly, rather than continue the war in hopes of further gains.
• Treaty of Prague and Peace of Vienna:
  • The war was formally concluded on August 23, 1866 by the Treaty of Prague.
  • The Austrians had accepted mediation from France’s Napoleon III.
  • The Peace of Prague resulted in the dissolution of the German Confederation and the permanent exclusion of Austria from German affairs.
  • The treaty assigned Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia. The latter also annexed Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt outright, thus acquiring the territory that had separated the eastern and the western parts of the Prussian state.
  • By the Peace of Vienna (Oct. 3, 1866) Austria ceded Venetia for transfer to Italy although the Austrians were far more successful in the military field against Italian troops.
• North German Confederation (1867):
  • Prussia’s victory in the war enabled it to organize the North German Confederation of all the states north of river Main with the Prussian king as the President. Austria, and most of its allies, were excluded from the North German Confederation.
  • The new North German Confederation had its own constitution, flag, and governmental and administrative structures.
  • The North German Constitution created a national parliament with universal suffrage (for men above the age of 25), the Reichstag.
    • Another important organ was the Bundesrat, the ‘federal council’ of the representatives of the allied governments.
    • To adopt a law, a majority in the Reichstag and in the Bundesrat was necessary. This gave the allied governments, meaning the states and their princes, an important veto.
• Results of the Seven Weeks War:
  • Effect on Austria:
    • The end of Austrian dominance of the German states and her shifted attention to the Balkans. She also abandoned policy of centralisation by Compromise with Hungarians.
    • The Austrian Chancellor Ferdinand von Beust was “impatient to take his revenge on Bismarck for Sadowa.” As a preliminary step, the Ausgleich (Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867) with Hungary was rapidly concluded.
      • Beust persuaded Francis Joseph to accept Magyar (of Hungary) demands which he had until then rejected.
      • Austrian emperor Franz Joseph accepted a settlement (the Austro-Hungarian Compromise which lasted till the end of the First World War when Austrian Empire fell apart) in which he gave his Hungarian holdings equal status with his Austrian domains, creating the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.
      • These two were made independent in all matters except war and diplomacy.
      • Vienna became capital of Austria and Budapest of Hungary.
      • Both were to have same ruler, who in Austria would bear the title of Emperor and in Hungary of King.
      • Each was to have its own separate constitution, legislature and administration and each was to control its internal affairs without interference from each other.
    • This compromise satisfied two races of Austrian Empire, Germans of Austria and Magyars of Hungary.
      • But the subordinate race, especially Slavs refused to acquiesce in this system and demanded the same privileges as were accorded to Hungarians. They wanted Federal and not Dual Empire.
  • Effect on Prussia:
    • Prussia emerged as great military power and North confederation united her scattered territory and gave her a scientific frontier as well as an invaluable site for the construction of a naval bas at Kiel.
    • Her astonishing victory altered balance of power.
    • Triumph of Bismarckism:
      • The success of the war closed the constitutional struggle over army reform and it was blow to German liberals. Militarism was justified.
      • New political party national Liberal Party came out whose programme was Bismarckism, i.e. to uphold Bismarck in his national endevours.
      • Bismarck, the “best hated” man became most popular man.
    • Through military victory, Prussia under Bismarck’s influence had overcome Austria’s active resistance to the idea of a unified Germany.
    • Austria’s influence over the German states may have been broken, but the war also splintered the spirit of pan-German unity: most of the German states resented Prussian power politics.

• • Effect on Italy:
    • Italy acquired Venetia and advanced one step further for her unification.

• • Effect on France:
    • The French public resented the Prussian victory and demanded “Revenge for Sadova”, illustrating anti-Prussian sentiment in France — a problem that would accelerate in the months leading up to the Franco-Prussian War.
    • The Austro-Prussian War damaged relations with the French government. At a meeting in Biarritz in September 1865 with Napoleon III, Bismarck had let it be understood (or Napoleon had thought he understood) that France might annex parts of Belgium and Luxembourg in exchange for its neutrality in the war. These annexations did not happen, resulting in animosity from Napoleon towards Bismarck.
    • Prussia chose not to seek Austrian territory for itself, and this made it possible for Prussia and Austria to ally in the future, since Austria felt threatened more by Italian and Pan-Slavic irredentism than by Prussia.
    • The war left Prussia dominant in German politics (since Austria was now excluded from Germany and no longer the top German power), and German nationalism would encourage the remaining independent states to ally with Prussia in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, and then to accede to the crowning of King William of Prussia as German Emperor in 1871. The united German states would become one of the most influential of all the European powers.