Q. Critically examine the political, military and administrative factors that led to the transformation of the Maratha character in the 18th century. How did these changes influence its rise and eventual decline? [UPSC- 2025]

Ans:

In the 18th century the Maratha state changed character. Under Shivaji, it had been a compact, centralised kingdom (swarajya):

• A crowned king (Chhatrapati) was the source of authority.
• Ministers were appointed and non-hereditary.
• Officials received cash salaries.
• The army was a light cavalry force fighting from hill forts.

By the mid-18th century it had become a sprawling confederacy:

• It was led by a hereditary Peshwa (chief minister) at Pune.
• Great sardars (military chiefs) held hereditary territories.
• Expansion depended on sharing revenue claims (chauth and sardeshmukhi).
• Large, costly armies included mercenaries and artillery.

Political, military and administrative factors drove this transformation. The same changes made rapid expansion possible, so that by the 1750s the Marathas were the leading power in India. They also produced the centrifugal tendencies, rivalries, financial strain and dependence on outsiders that led to decline and defeat by the British (1818).

I. The starting point: Shivaji’s model

• Kingship: Shivaji was crowned Chhatrapati in 1674.
• Council of ministers: The Ashtapradhan, a council of eight ministers, was appointed by the king and was not hereditary.
• Revenue:
  • Land was assessed directly.
  • Hereditary local officials (deshmukhs, holders of watans) were kept under control, and officials were paid in cash.
  • Chauth and sardeshmukhi were collected only from territories outside the swarajya.
• Military:
  • Light cavalry, made up of bargirs (troopers mounted and equipped by the state) and shiledars (troopers who brought their own horses).
  • Hill forts and a navy.
  • Guerrilla tactics.

II. Political factors

• Civil war and divided kingship:
  • Shahu was released by the Mughals in 1707 and fought Tarabai, widow of his uncle Rajaram, for the throne.
  • A rival line was established at Kolhapur, and the Treaty of Warna (1731) confirmed the division.
  • Shahu’s dependence on able ministers strengthened the Peshwa’s position.
• Power passes to the Peshwa:
  • Balaji Vishwanath (Peshwa from 1713) obtained Mughal grants (sanads, 1719). These recognised Maratha rule in their homeland and their right to chauth and sardeshmukhi over the Deccan.
  • The Peshwaship became hereditary under Baji Rao I.
  • The Sangola agreement (1750) transferred effective power from the Chhatrapati at Satara to the Peshwa.
• Rise of the sardars:
  • Scindia, Holkar, Gaekwad, Bhonsle and Pawar carved out semi-autonomous territories, so the state became a confederacy.
• Working within the Mughal framework:
  • The Marathas ruled through Mughal sanads.
  • Under the Ahmadiya treaty (1752), they undertook to protect the Mughal emperor in return for revenue rights.
  • This was legitimacy through accommodation, not outright sovereignty. Andre Wink calls this kind of politics “fitna”: building power within the existing order by bargaining and dividing rivals.
• Caste tensions:
  • The Chitpavan Brahmin Peshwas came to dominate, which caused tension with the Maratha sardars and the Chhatrapati’s family.
• Relations with other Indian powers:
  • The Marathas interfered in the succession dispute at Jaipur in the 1740s and demanded tribute from Rajputs, Jats and Sikhs.
  • Allies alienated in this way stayed away at Panipat.
• Succession disputes:
  • Raghunathrao challenged the young Madhavrao I.
  • Peshwa Narayanrao was murdered (1773), and a regency council (the Barbhai, or “twelve brothers”) was led by Nana Phadnavis.
  • Raghunathrao turned to the British, leading to the Treaty of Surat (1775).
  • Peshwa Baji Rao II later accepted the subsidiary alliance at Bassein (1802), placing British troops in his territory under British control.

III. Military factors

• From guerrilla warfare to expeditionary armies:
  • The Marathas moved from defending the homeland to campaigning across India.
  • Annual tribute-collecting expeditions (mulkgiri) became a way of life and a source of revenue.
• Mercenaries, artillery and European-trained infantry:
  • The armies hired Arabs, Rohillas, Sikhs, Rajputs and soldiers from the Gangetic plain (Purbiyas).
  • Ibrahim Khan Gardi’s artillery fought at Panipat.
  • Mahadji Scindia’s battalions were trained by the French officers de Boigne and Perron.
  • Holkar also employed European officers.
  • These forces were expensive, less mobile, and not always loyal.
• Private armies of the sardars:
  • Each chief’s troops were loyal to their chief, not to the Peshwa.
  • The confederacy therefore had no unified command.
• The navy:
  • Kanhoji Angre built a strong navy.
  • The Peshwa later joined the British in destroying Tulaji Angre’s fleet at Vijaydurg (Gheria, 1756). This weakened Maratha power at sea.
• Defeats:
  • Panipat (1761).
  • The Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803), with defeats at Assaye and Laswari.
  • The Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–18), with defeats at Kirkee, Koregaon and Ashti.

IV. Administrative factors

• Land assignments (saranjams):
  • Chiefs were paid through saranjams, assignments of land revenue for military service.
  • These became hereditary, like watans, and eroded central control.
  • Cash salaries gave way to land assignments.
• Revenue sharing:
  • Chauth (a quarter of the revenue) was divided among several claimants:
    • The Chhatrapati’s share (babti).
    • The sardars’ share (mokasa).
    • Smaller shares (sahotra and nadgaunda).
  • Sardeshmukhi (a further 10%) went to the Chhatrapati.
  • Stewart Gordon shows how this created overlapping claims in place of unified administration.
• Administration at Pune:
  • The Huzur Daftar, the central record office at Pune, maintained detailed records.
  • Revenue officials (kamavisdars and mamlatdars) managed the core territories.
  • Northern conquests, however, were held as tributary areas rather than directly administered.
• Revenue farming and debt:
  • The right to collect revenue (ijara) was increasingly farmed out to bidders.
  • The state relied on Pune bankers (sahukars) for credit, and debts mounted.
• Local institutions continued:
  • Hereditary local officials, the deshmukhs, deshpandes and patils (village headmen), remained.
  • Village councils (panchayats) continued to settle disputes.
• Failure to build a unified administration:
  • The Marathas did not create an administration that integrated their vast conquests.
  • In the north, Maratha rule was often seen as predatory, a view taken by Jadunath Sarkar.

V. How the changes helped the rise

• Rapid expansion: Decentralisation let sardars expand on their own initiative:
  • Malwa and Gujarat.
  • Bundelkhand.
  • Orissa and Bengal, through the Bhonsle raids.
  • Punjab, reaching Attock in 1758.
• Military victories: Baji Rao I won major victories at Palkhed (1728), near Delhi (1737) and at Bhopal (1738).
• Legitimacy: Mughal sanads gave the Marathas a legal claim to revenue across the Deccan and beyond.
• Resources: Chauth and mulkgiri extracted revenue without the cost of direct administration, and bankers provided credit.
• Administration: The Peshwa’s administrative skill and Pune’s record office kept the core territories well managed.
• Regional identity: Marathi identity and the Varkari devotional tradition gave the Marathas cohesion.
• Recovery after Panipat:
  • Madhavrao I defeated the Nizam at Rakshasbhuvan (1763) and checked Haidar Ali.
  • Mahadji Scindia restored Shah Alam II to Delhi (1771–72) and became regent of the empire (1784).

VI. How the changes led to decline

• Pulling apart: The sardars became rivals, notably Scindia against Holkar. They pursued separate policies and sometimes allied with the British.
• A weak centre: After Madhavrao I’s death (1772), the Peshwa’s authority declined:
  • Succession disputes followed.
  • The Marathas lost Mahadji Scindia (1794) and Nana Phadnavis (1800).
  • Baji Rao II accepted British protection (1802).
• British intervention: The British exploited divisions:
  • Raghunathrao’s alliance with them led to the First Anglo-Maratha War, ending with the Treaty of Salbai (1782).
  • Bassein (1802) brought the Second Anglo-Maratha War.
  • The Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–18) brought final defeat.
• Isolation: The Marathas had alienated the Rajputs, Jats, Sikhs, the Nizam and Mysore, and had no Indian allies against the British.
• Financial strain: Costly mercenary armies, debt to bankers and revenue farming exhausted the state’s finances.
• Military problems:
  • Mobility was lost.
  • European-trained units were expensive, and their officers sometimes deserted, as Perron did in 1803.
  • Randolf Cooper argues that the Maratha army had modernised effectively. In his view, defeat came from finance, divided leadership and desertion, not from backward technology.
• Panipat (1761): The defeat cost the Marathas a generation of leaders and much prestige.
• No unified administration: Without one, conquered territories could not be consolidated.

VII. Critical examination

• The “national” view: M.G. Ranade (Rise of the Maratha Power) and G.S. Sardesai saw the Marathas as a national power and Hindu-pad-padshahi (Hindu sovereignty) as their ideal.
• The critical view:
  • Grant Duff and Jadunath Sarkar stressed predatory expansion and the Brahmin–Maratha rift.
  • Sarkar also pointed to military backwardness.
• The revisionist view:
  • Stewart Gordon (The Marathas 1600–1818), Andre Wink (Land and Sovereignty in India) and Frank Perlin see the confederacy as a creative state-building network that drew on bankers, revenue-sharing and local elites.
  • In their view, decline came from British power and internal politics, not from inherent weakness.
• Military debate: Surendra Nath Sen, A.R. Kulkarni and Randolf Cooper question the idea that Maratha decline was caused mainly by military backwardness.
• Balance:
  • The confederate structure was a strength in expansion but a weakness in crisis.
  • Divided authority, financial strain and isolation made the Marathas vulnerable.
  • The British, with superior finance and unified command, exploited these weaknesses.

Conclusion

Shivaji’s centralised kingdom evolved into a Peshwa-led confederacy through succession conflicts, hereditary sardar territories, private armies and decentralised revenue arrangements. These changes enabled rapid expansion and Maratha predominance by the 1750s, but also weakened central authority, intensified rivalries and strained finances, creating opportunities for British expansion between 1775 and 1818.