• The period following the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 saw growing factionalism in the nobility, the rapid decline in the power and prestige of the Mughal Emperor and the Imperial Centre, the further accentuation of the jagirdari crisis, and the rise of regional states which were either breakaway provinces, or rose in defiance of the Mughal state but were prepared to pay token allegiance to the Mughal Emperor.
• The Marathas sweeping out of Maharashtra, set up a series of regional states, and made a bid for all-India supremacy which climaxed at the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761. 
• The invasions of Nadir Shah and of Ahmad Shah Durrani opened the north-west for foreign invasions. After the death of Muhammad Shah in 1748, the Mughal Emperor shrank to a shadow, though nominal allegiance continued to be paid to him.

Rajput Affairs:

There are two phases in Bahadur Shah’s Rajput policy – the earlier phase till 1709 when he not only tried

to maintain Aurangzeb’s settlement with the Rajputs, but to go further. On the excuse that Ajit Singh

had neither attended the court, nor sent a customary letter of congratulations on his accession, and that

he had occupied Jodhpur and was opposing practice of Islam there and restoring temples, Bahadur Shah

decided to move to the Deccan via Ajmer. When the Imperial army reached near Ajmer, the Rana

offered his submission which was accepted. Ajit Singh also applied for pardon, which was accepted after

Ajit Singh had suffered a defeat at the hands of Mihrab Khan, the

459

faujdar-designatre of Jodhpur. Ajit Singh was restored to his previous mansab of 3500 / 3000, and the

title of Maharaja, but his capital Jodhpur, remained under imperial control. Earlier, on the ground that

there was a dispute about succession between Jai Singh and his brother, Vijay Singh, the latter having

helped Bahadur Shah at Jaju, Bahadur Shah had instructed the subedar of Ajmer to bring the state of

Amber under khalisa and appoint a Mughal faujdar there. On reaching Amber, Bahadur Shah stayed

there for three days, and renamed the city Islamabad. The property of Jai Singh was confiscated, and the

state was entrusted to Vijai Singh, with an imperial faujdar remaining at Amber.

Bahadur Shah and his wazir, Munim Khan, soon found that they were not capable of upholding these

policies. When the imperial camp reached Mahabaleshwar on the Narmada, Ajit Singh and Jai Singh,

who had accompanied the imperial camp in the, hope of the reversal of the earlier orders, escaped and

repaired to Udaipur where they made an agreement with the Maharana for joint resistance against the

Mughals.-However, in practice, there was little coordination among the Rajputs. Jai Singh recovered

Amber, and Ajit Singh ousted the Mughal faujdar from Jodhpur. The Maharana recovered the parganas

of Pur, Mandal, and Bidnur sequestered by Aurangzeb in lieu of jizyah. The Rajputs over-ran Didwana,

and gained a notable victory over Saiyid Husain Khan Baraha, the faujdar of Sambhar, when he was

accidently killed in the course of the battle. After the rainy season, Ajit Singh invested Ajmer with a force

of 20,000 but received no help from Jai Singh and the Maharana. He raised the siege on a payment of

Rs.80,000/- from the governor, Shujaat Khan, though the latter sent a lying report to Bahadur Shah

claiming a victory.

Meanwhile, news about the victory of Bahadur Shah over Kam Bakhsh, and his returning to North India,

resolved to lead an army to punish and chastise the Rajputs became current. In alarm, the Rajputs

sought the mediation of their old friends, Asad Khan and Prince Azim-ush-Shan. At their instance, Jai

Singh and Ajit Singh were restored to their mansabs. Asad Khan who had been placed in over-all charge

of Lahore, Delhi and Ajmer subahs, offered to the Rajas sanads for the grant of their homelands,

provided they raised their thanas from Sambhar and

460

Didwana, and accepted appointments to the provinces of Kabul and Gujarat.

There was thus a sharp difference of opinion about the Rajputs between Bahadur Shah and Munim Khan

on the one hand, and Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan on the other. The latter wanted to conciliate the

Rajput rajas by not only returning their homelands, but readmitting them to the position of being

partners in the kingdom by assigning them high administrative positions. On return to North India,

Bahadur Shah and Munim Khan made a typical compromise. In June, 1710, Ajit Singh and Jai Singh were

granted audience “during the march”, i.e. not in a regular court, and their homelands, Jodhpur and

Amber, restored. They were permitted to go home provided they came with a force within six months to

serve wherever asked to do so. Since news of the uprising of Banda Bahadur had already reached

Bahadur Shah, he was anxious to use the Rajputs in the campaign against him. As a sweetner, Munim

Khan revived Asad Khan’s proposal of appointing the Rajas to Gujarat and Kabul an idea which the

Rajputs construed as a devise to separate them, and deal with them individually.

After considerable pressure, and after a lapse of fifteen months, Ajit Singh and Jai Singh appeared at

Bahadur Shah’s court in October 1711, and were appointed to Sadhaura to guard the foot-hills from the

raids of Banda’s followers. By this time Munim Khan had died, and all power had passed into the hands

of Prince Azim-ush-Shan. Although Azim-ush-Shan had been a friend of the Rajputs, he had broken with

Zulfiqar Khan, and was anxious to win over the old Alamgiri nobles to his side in preparation for the

inevitable civil war. The Alamgiri nobles, apparently, were not in favour of a compromising policy

towards the Rajputs. The contemporary writer, Mirza Muhammad Harisi, representing their point of

view, called the earlier agreement with the Rajputs as “being inconsistent with good policy as well as the

dignity of the sovereign.” This, it seems, was the reason why after serving for two and a half months

with “a large army”, Jai Singh was appointed faujdarof Chitrakut, and Ajit Singh of Sorath in Gujarat.

These were far below the expectations of the Rajput rajas, and they petitioned for leave to go home.

This was agreed to provided they left chaukis (outposts) behind.

The Marathas and the Deccan

The reign of Bahadur Shah not only saw the emergence of sharp

461

difference of opinion regarding the policy to be followed towards the Rajputs but also towards the

Marathas and the Deccan. When Azam Shah was proceeding towards North India, at Dauraha near the

Narmada, Shahu was allowed to escape along with about 50 – 60 of his followers. There was both policy

and calculation in this. Shahu’s release, it was felt, would weaken Tara Bai and safeguard the Mughal

possessions from Maratha incursions during Azam’s absence while the Marathas fought among

themselves. Also, Shahu was considered the rightful successor of Sambhaji and the one with whom

some agreement could be arrived at. According to the contemporary historian, Khafi Khan, the release

of Shahu was done at the instance of Zulfiqar Khan “who was very intimate with Shahu and had for long

been interested in his affairs.” However, there is no support for the contention put forwards by some

Maratha sources that Azam Shah had made an agreement with Shahu, granting him Shivaji’s swarajya,

the chauth and sardeshmukhi of the six subahs of the Deccan, and other concessions.

After defeating Tara Bai in a battle, and crowning himself at Satara, Shahu tried to strengthen himself by

securing from the Mughal due confirmation of his position, and the grant of chauth and sardeshmukhi of

the Deccan. Shortly after Bahadur Shah’s accession, Shahu had sent him a letter of congratulations and

asked for forgiveness of his “sins”. In return, he was restored to his mansab of 7000 / 7000, and asked to

render military help against Kam Bakhsh. Shahu expressed his inability to attend in person, but sent one

of his best known sardars, Nimaji Sindhia, with a large force to join Bahadur Shah, which did good

service.

After the defeat of Kam Bakhsh (January 1909), Bahadur Shah offered the post of Viceroy of the Deccan

to his soa Prince Azim-ush-Shan who was gradually gaining favour with him. But Azim-ush-Shan

preferred the (absentee) governorship of the Eastern provinces, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa which had

been under his charge earlier. Unlike the Deccan these areas were peaceful and productive. The

viceroyalty of the Deccan was then offered to the next most powerful person, Zulfiqar Khan. We are told

that Zulfiqar Khan was granted full authority in all the revenue and administrative matters pertaining to

the Deccan, and allowed to remain at the court to combine his new post with his previous post of Mir

Bakhshi. His old associate and protege, Daud Khan Panni, was made his deputy in the Deccan,

462

with the rank of 7000 / 5000 du-aspa-sih-aspa, and the governorships of Bijapur, Berar and Aurangabad.

His headquarters were fixed at Aurangabad, near Daultabad in the old Nizam Shahi kingdom of

Ahmadnagar.

These concessions which made Zulfiqar Khan’s position far stronger than that of the wazir, Munim Khan,

would have made sense if Bahadur Shah was also prepared to be guided by Zulfiqar Khan regarding the

political affairs of the Deccan which he knew intimately. However, Bahadur Shah was reluctant to

strengthen Zulfiar Khan’s position any further. After the victory over Kam Bakhsh, Zulfiqar Khan

introduced Shahu’s wakil to the emperor. He presented an application for the grant of chauth and

sardeshmukhi of the six subahs of the Deccan on condition of restoring prosperity to the ruined land.

Munim Khan presented Tara Bai’s wakil who requested for a farman in the name of her (minor) son,

Shivaji II. She asked only for sardeshmukhi of the Deccan, without any reference to chauth, and also

offered to suppress other insurgents and to restore order in the country.

A great contention on the matter arose between Munim Khan and Zulfiqar Khan. Matters worsened

because Munim Khan wanted to detach Khandesh and Pain-Ghat in Berar from the Deccan, create a

separate subah out of them, and appoint his son, Mahabat Khan, as its governor with full powers of

appointment, dismissal and transfer of officials. Unwilling to displease either, Bahadur Shah did not

approve the idea of the partitioning of the Deccan, and ordered that sanad for sardeshmukhi only be

given in accordance with the requests of both Munim Khan and Zulfikar Khan.

Whatever the motives of Bahadur Shah, his decision was an invitation to both Shahu and Tara Bai to

plunder the imperial territories to enforce their claims. As soon as Bahadur Shah left the Deccan, Shahu

came out of fort Rajgarh, and issued an order to his sardars: “The Emperor has granted me (sar)

deshmukhi of these parts, but not yet the chauth. You should, therefore, raid the imperial territories and

create disorder (till he agrees to do so).” Soon, bands of Marathas invaded and plundered Burhanpur in

Khandesh and defeated and killed the governor, Mir Ahmad Khan. They also invaded Bijapur and

Ahmadnagar, appeared near Aurangabad and plundered the surrounding area. The Mughals were

powerless to check these inroads, though Daud Khan Panni moved about with a large army chasing the

463

Marathas. He also tried to sow dissensions among the Marathas, winning over to his side a number of

powerful Maratha sardars, such as Rao Rambha Nimbalkar, Paima Raj Sindhia and even Chandrasen

Jadhav. But the Maratha raids continued.

Ultimately, early in 1711, Daud Khan made a pact with Shahu. According to this pact, the chauth and

sardeshmukhi was promised to Shahu. But the amounts were to be collected not by Maratha agents, but

by Daud Khan’s deputy, Hiraman, who would pay the Marathas a lump sum. The jagirs of the princes

were to be exempt from any charge.

No written confirmation of the grant was given but the agreement could hardly have been made

without the active support of Zulfiqar Khan, and the tacit consent of the Emperor. This was easier since

Munim Khan had died by then.

Even this pact could not secure peace since the Maratha sardars had by now become free agents, not

answerable to anyone and eager to plunder on their own. However the scale of Maratha attacks

diminished.

Accentuation of the Party Conflict

The Sikh uprising which began towards the end of 1708 under Banda Bahadur, beginning with the defeat

of the faujdars of Sonepat and Sirhind, and the establishment of virtual Sikh control “from a few days

march from Delhi to the outskirts of Lahore”, kept Bahadur Shah busy from the middle of 1710 to his

death at Lahore in February, 1712. Banda was besieged at Lohgarh, but managed to escape to the hills

when the fort was stormed towards the end of the year. Mughal operation slackened thereafter.

Bahadur Shah returned to Lahore and left it to the nobles to conduct operations against Banda.

In February, 1711, Munim Khan died after a short illness. His death had been hastened by Bahadur

Shah’s charges of negligence in the escape of Banda from Lohgarh. Zulfiqar Khan now resumed the

demand for wizarat. Prince Azim-ush-Shan who was close to Bahadur Shah was prepared to

accommodate Zulfiqar Khan, provided he relinquished the posts of Mir Bakhshi and Viceroy of the

Deccan, which he proposed, should be given to the sons of Munim Khan. Bahadur Shah did not like the

proposal because he did not consider the sons of Munim Khan to be competent for the posts. Zulfiqar

Khan, too, stoutly opposed the proposal because he was not prepared to relinquish

464

the posts of Mir Bakhshi and Viceroy of the Deccan. Hence, he proposed that the post of wazir should be

given to Asad Khan. Bahadur Shah and Prince Azim-ush-Shan felt that the combination of the posts of

wazir, Mir Bakhshi and Viceroy of the Deccan in the hands of one family would be dangerous for the

dynasty. Ultimately, no wazir was appointed. Sadullah Khan was made the chief diwan, and asked to

work under the “supervision and control of Prince Azim-ush-Shan” (Khafi Khan).

Thus, the most energetic and capable prince and the most powerful and ambitious noble whose

objective was the concentration of all power in his hands to reshape imperial policies were put on a

collision course.

Bahadur Shah made a cautious departure from Aurangzeb’s policies. While ban on wine drinking and

singing and dancing in open court was continued, Bahadur Shah hardly shared Aurangzeb’s orthodox

views. Like his wazir, Munim Khan, he was a liberal sufi in outlook, and incurred the displeasure of the

orthodox elements by assuming the title “Saiyid”. Claiming to be a mujtahid or interpreter of Holy Laws,

Bahadur Shah ordered at Lahore that the word “wasi” or successor be inserted after the name of Ali in

the Friday prayers. This outraged the Sunni elements since it placed Ali in a higher position than the

other three Caliphs, and led to widespread rioting. The order had to be withdrawn, but from this time

onwards, there was a definite breach between the orthodox elements and the Mughal emperor.

Struggle for “New Wizarat”: Zulfiqar Khan & Jahandar Shah (1712-13)

The civil war among the sons of Bahadur Shah following his death was, in essence, a struggle between

Azim-ush-Shan, the most energetic prince with the largest resources, and the most powerful noble,

Zulfiqar Khan. In order to counter Azim-ush-Shan, Zulfiqar had brought the other three princes into a

pact according to which the empire was to be divided among them, but sikka and khutba would remain

in the name of the eldest, Jahandar Shah. Zulfiqar would be the common w azir who would reside at the

court of Jahandar Shah, with deputies at the courts of the others. The idea of a partitioning the empire is

supposed to have been bequeathed by Aurangzeb, and Bahadur Shah had professed to abide by it

before the Battle of Jaju, as also before

465

the tussle with Kam Bakhsh. But the idea never seems to have been entertained seriously by anybody.

After the defeat of Azim-ush-Shan, which was due to the efforts and energy of Zulfiqar Khan, the latter

lost no time in defeating the other two brothers, Rafi-ush-Shan and Jahan Shah.

After the accession of Jahandar Shah at Lahore, Zulfiqar Khan became wazir almost as a matter of right.

He also retained the Viceroyalty of the Deccan which he continued to govern through his deputy, Daud

Khan. He was granted the unprecedented rank of 10,000 / 10,000 du-aspa sih-aspa and the tietle of yarwafadar (faithful friend.). His father, Asad Khan, remained Wakil-i-Mutlaq, and was granted the

(absentee) governorship of Gujarat, and the mansab of 12,0 00/12,000. Although Jahandar called him

“uncle” out of respect, Asad Khan refrained from taking interest in public affairs, and seldom went to the

court. Thus, all power remained in the hands of Zulfiqar Khan, and Jahandar Shah was guided by his

advice.

Zulfiqar Khan utilised his powers and position to institute a broad liberal, inclusionist policy. First and

foremost, only nine days after the formal accession of Jahandar Shah, and at the suggestion of Asad

Khan, jizyah was abolished. Although jizyah had been suspended in the Deccan by Aurangzeb in 1704 for

the duration of the war, and had generally fallen in disuse, it was asserted on occasions under Bahadur

Shah. Thus, jizyah was levied in Jodhpur after Ajit Singh had been forced to abandon it. Zulfiqar Khan’s

step was obviously designed to win general Hindu opinion to his side.

Next, Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were raised to the ranks of 7000/7000, and granted the titles of Mirza Raja

Sawai and Maharaja respectively. Soon afterwards, Jai Singh was granted the subedari of Malwa and Ajit

Singh of Gujarat, along with other concessions. These cannot be considered paper appointments. Ajit

Singh had just started for Gujarat when he received news that the rebellion in the East by Farrukh Siyar,

son of Azim-ush-Shan, had reached serious proportion. Hence, he put off his deprture.

In the case of the Marathas, the earlier accord made by Daud Khan was continued. A new step taken by

Zulfiqar Khan was the grant of an imperial mansab of 3000/2000 to Shivaji II, son of Raja Ram. A khilat

and a farman granting him the (sar) deshmukhi of subah Hyderabad was also sent to him. Thus, Zulfiqar

Khan

466

postulated a division of the swarajya of Shivaji, and the chauth and sardeshmukhi of the Deccan

between Shahu and Shivaji II.

The major problem facing Zulfiqar Khan, however, was the growing crisis of the jagirdari system, and his

relations with the nobles as also those considered close to the young Emperor. The jagirdari crisis had

worsened under Bahadur Shah due to his reckless grant of mansabs and inams. According to the

contemporary, Bhimsen, even clerks had received high mansabs. To check the Emperor’s excessive

liberality, with the support of Munim Khan, an official, Mustaid Khan, was appointed to examine the

suitability of new appointees as well as the promotions. He was also to examine the grants given for the

support of holy and learned men. This led to inordinate delays and seems to have been resented by the

khanazads who had been waiting for a long time for the lifting of Aurangzeb’s ban on new

appointments. It seems that they approached two of the queens who put great pressure on Mustaid

Khan. The Emperor told the officials that his signature was a formality, and the Arz Muqarrar or the

official incharge of confirmation of jagirs could do as he liked. In consequence, the imperial signature

lost its value and jagir continued to be awarded liberally.

Another reform measure adopted at the time was to defer the charge for the upkeep of the royal

transport or khurak dawwab. It was now to be deducted from the assigned salary of a mansabdar after a

jagir had been granted to him. This saved the nobles from much harrasement and, in the words of Khafi

Khan, meant that “the charge for the maintenance of animals was remitted.” But this implied additional

strain on the Imperial khalisa. An idea of the acute financial situation which forced Bahadur Shah may be

guaged from the remark of agent Chabela Das, in 1711 during the Sikh uprising “battles are fought with

the army and provisions of the army requires money, but money is not seen anywhere. Let us see how

God wins.” Khafi Khan says that at the time of the conquest c. Agra fort, Bahadur Shah had found

thirteen crores of coined and uncoined gold and silver. These had been exhausted by the end of his

reign. In consequence, great parsimony was shown in the government establishments, especially the

royal household, so much as that money was received every day from the treasury of Prince Azim -ushShan to keep things going.

This was the situation Zulfiqar Khan inherited, and which

467

explains the charge of parsimoniousness brought against him by many contemporary writers. We are

told that unlike the earlier tradition, Zulfiqar Khan flatly refused to give any employment to the

supporters of the defeated princes. Thus, two to three thousand old servants were made unemployed.

The properties of some of the leading supporters of these princes were confiscated – a departure from

Bahadur Shah’s policy. One of those who was denied employment, Iradat Khan, charges Zulfiqar Khan

with stinginess and reluctance to give jagirs to others while he appropriated enormous revenues and

emoluments for himself, and of harrasing and plotting to ruin old nobles. Zulfiqar Khan issued an order

that no sanads for jagirs was to be granted to any mansabdar till his claim had been checked and

confirmed. Nor were any increments in ranks to be granted till then. He also attempted to compel the

mansabdars to maintain their stipulated quota of troops, and to enforce regulations regarding muster

and dagh. We do no know to what extent these measures effected the old nobles. However, it was

difficult to maintain economy and enforcement of regulations in an atmosphere of competitiveness.

Soon the rules of Zulfiqar Khan were thrown to the winds and mansabs began to be given to royal

favourites with a free hand.

In matter of revenue administration, Zulfiqar Khan left everything in the hands of his former diwan,

Sabha Chand, a kayastha, who was given the title of Raja and appointed diwan of the crown lands. We

are told that during Jahandar Shah’s time, the old rules of business were thrown to the winds, and ijara

(revenue farming) became universal.

Zulfiqar Khan tried to win over the old Alamgiri and Bahadur Shahi nobles. It was due to his efforts that

many of these nobles continued to hold important posts and positions at the centre as well as in the

provinces. He resisted the elevation of new men considered to be low born, and on more than one

occasion defended the old nobles against the pretensions of the friends and relations of the queen, Lal

Kunwar, who came from a family of kalawants or professional musicians. We are told that it was a fine

time for musicians and ministrals who would swagger round the streets of Delhi in a noisy manner,

making themselves obnoxious to high and low by their high-handedness. On one occasion Zuhra, a

vegetable seller by profession and friend of Lal

468

Kunwar, insulted Chin Qulich Khan by blocking his way in a narrow street, and calling him “the son of

that blind man”. Whereupon Chin Qulich Khan’s men belaboured Zuhra’s men. Her appeal to Lal Kunwar

for redressal had no effect because the wazir backed Chin Qulich Khan.

At the beginning of Jahandar’s accession, Zulfiqar Khan had contemplated getting rid of his old rival,

Chin Qulich Khan, who had been won over by Azim-ush-Shan, by promises of high office. After the death

of Bahadur Shah, Chin Qulich had recruited an army but had moved only a few stages out of Delhi when

he received news of Azim-ush-Shan’s defeat. Hence, he had dismissed his soldiers and returned to Delhi.

Zulfiqar Khan was dissuaded from proceeding against Chin Qulich by Abdus Samad Khan, a Turani who

was married in the Chin family but had actively helped Zulfiqar Khan in the civil war as Superintendent

of Artillery. He had been made Sadr with the rank of 7000. When Jahandar Shah reached Delhi, Chin

Qulich met him outside the city. Chin Qulich was restored to his mansab of 5000, and was appointed

governor of Malwa. But he remained dissatisfied, and resigned his post and mansab, ostensibly as a

protest against the rise of new nobles and the neglect of the khanazads.

Thus, a powerful section in the old nobility remained dissatisfied, not only because of the neglect of the

old Turani nobles, or khanazads, but because they disliked all power and authority slipping into the

hands of one of them, Zulfiqar Khan.

Two internal centres of opposition to Zulfiqar Khan emerged. One of these consisted of Kokaltash Khan

the Mir Bakhshi, and his relations and friends. Kokaltash Khan, the foster-brother of Jahandar Shah, had

been his main man of affairs for a long time, and been his deputy at Multan with the rank of 2500/2250.

Jahandar Shah had promised him the wizarat should he become the Emperor. Kokaltash bitterly

resented the elevation of Zulfiqar Khan to wizarat, though it was inescapable. Kokaltash was given the

post of Mir Bakhshi, with the mansab of 9000 / 9000, and made governor of Multan and Thatta, along

with the faujdari of Bakkhar. His family members also prospered – one brother being made governor of

Agra with the rank of 8000, and a son-in-law appointed second bakhshi with the rank of 8000/ 8000.

Among the dissatisfied nobles who joined this group, the most important was Sadullah Khan, a Kashmiri,

who had been

469

used to exclude Zulfiqar Khan from the wizarat after the death of Munim Khan, and now feared his ire.

This group not only began to interfere in administration, but tried to effect a break between Jahandar

Shah and the wazir by suggesting to him that the wazir was too ambitious, and that to fulfil his

ambitions, he would put a new prince on the throne. However, for the time being, this game did not

succeed. In fact, in a dispute between Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash Khan regarding the post of Arz

Mukarrar, Jahandar Shah upheld the wazir. On another occasion he told Kokaltash Khan that the wazir

had full authority to do what he liked and that he, the Emperor, could not interfere in anything, or even

utter a word in protest.

The second group consisted of Lal Kunwar, and her relations and friends. Though called a “dancing girl”,

Lal Kunwar was not a concubine. She came from the class of people called kalawant or professional

musicians. Her father, Khasusiyat Khan, was a descendant of Tansen, the famous musician of Akbar.

After being made queen, she was allowed to march with drums beating like the Emperor, and five

hundred gentlemen troopers (ahadis) followed in her train. Coins are said to have been issued in her

name, but none have been found. She was the constant companion of the Emperor, and became

another avenue for those seeking Imperial favour. This was annoying to the wazir who lost perquisites

because every job seeker had to give him a commission and presents. Members of Lal Kunwar’s family

received mansabs, at least three of her brothers receiving mansabs between 5000 to 7000, and jagirs

and sinecures. We are told that due to Lal Kunwar,many kalawants received high mansabs of 5000 to

7000. However, the wazir did not permit any of Lal Kunwar’s brothers to hold posts such as

governorships on the ground that it would lead to discontent among the old nobles. On another

occasion, Khush-hal Khan, a brother of Lal Kunwar, was arrested by the order of the wazir on the charge

of molesting a married woman. His property was confiscated and he was sent to the fortress prison of

Samugurh. Lal Kunwar was powerless to intervene.

Thus, there can be no comparison between Lal Kunwar and Nur Jahan. Lal Kunwar seems to have had no

interest in politics, but had a childish fondness for festivities and illuminations.

470

Contemporaries who were shocked that a person from a demeaning profession should be raised to the

status of a queen, relate many stories as to how in his infatuation for her, Jahandar violated traditions of

propriety and decorum. Thus, he is accused of going shopping on a “moving throne”; having drunk in a

rath and found asleep in it the following morning – a story which it is hard to credit. However, the

prestige and fear of the Emperor had declined so much that when he went out for a hunt or festivities,

no nobles or army followed him. The breach between the old nobility and Jahandar Shah was the main

reason for his defeat only thirteen months after his accession, by Farrukh Siyar, the second son of Azim ush-Shan, backed by Saiyid Abdullah Khan and Husain Ali Baraha.

On the march from Lahore to Delhi in May 1712, Jahandar Shah heard of the movement of Farrukh Siyar

in the East. Although his attempt was considered to be ridiculous, the eldest son Prince Azzuddin w as

placed at the head of an army, and asked to proceed to Agra to watch the situation. Without consulting

Zulfiqar Khan, the over all control of the army was given to Khan-i-Dauran, the brother-in-law of

Kokaltash Khan. He was totally inexperienced of battle, and according to a contemporary, “had never

even killed a cat.”

During the next six months at Delhi, Jahandar Shah made merry. Hearing of the arrival of Farrukh Siyar

at Allahabad after being joined by the Saiyid Brothers, Prince Azzuddin advanced to Khajwa (near Kora)

but was easily routed. Jahandar Shah now awoke to his danger. The army had not been paid for the last

eleven months, and frantic efforts were made to find money. The zamindars of the area had withheld

money, and all stored money had been exhausted long ago. Hence, vessels of gold and silver stored

since the times of Akbar were broken up and the karkhanas opened up to pay the soldiers. Even the gold

roofs of the palaces were taken down. Thus, the task of vandalism was started by the Mughal princes

long before the Jats, Marathas and Nadir Shah arrived on the scene. In this way, an army of 100,000 and

a strong artillery were collected, and it was decided to move to Agra.

The events were too important for Chin Qulich Khan (the future Nizam-ul-Mulk) to be neglected. At the

instance of Zulfiqar Khan, he was propitiated with a rank of 7000. His cousin, M. Amin Khan,

471

who had been engaged in fighting desultory battles with Banda Bahadur, was also recalled. These two

powerful nobles were asked to join the army at Agra.

Although Jahandar Shah had a much larger army than Farrukh Siyar’s, divided counsel between Zulfiqar

Khan and Kokaltash Khan, the neutrality of the “Chin” group of Turanai nobles and the intrepidity of the

Saiyid brothers secured a complete victory for Farrukh Siyar (January 1713).

The brief duration of rule by Jahandar Shah and Zulfiqar Khan led to the emergence of a number of

important tendencies. It was shown that in the absence of a masterful ruler with sufficient competence

and capacity, the only alternative was a masterful wazir who had sufficient experience of administration,

could maintain law and order, and keep the nobility under control. But an all-powerful wazir was likely

to arouse the distrust of the king and the envy of the nobility. In such a situation the wazir could

maintain his position only by organising a bloc powerful enough to defeat any rival or combination of

rivals, as also try to secure the support of elements outside the court (Rajputs, Marathas, etc.). This, in

turn, posed a threat to the dynasty. The logical culmination was the establishment of a new dynasty and

a new nobility, as during the Sultanat or the complete subordination of the ruler to the wazir. During

Jahandar Shah’s rule, the situation did not lead up to this, but all the factors for such a development

were present.

In the second place, the reign of Jahandar Shah saw the rapid abandonment of the policies associated

with Aurangzeb. Thus, jizyah was abolished, and large concessions given to Rajputs and Marathas. It

would appear that Zulfiqar Khan was keen to revive the liberal traditions of Akbar, and to develop a

state based on the broad support of Muslims and Hindus. This underlined the failure of Aurangzeb’s

attempt to keep the empire together by emphasizing Islam and the Islamic character of the state.

The Saiyid Brothers’ Struggle for New Wizarat

Farrukh Siyar, the second son of Azim-ush-Shan, had been his father’s deputy in Bengal since 1707.

Perhaps in anticipation of a civil war following the death of Bahadur Shah, in 1711, he had been recalled

to the court. He had been at Patna for some months when he heard of the news of Bahadur Shah’s

death, and immediately proclaimed his father, Azim-ush-Shan, as king.

472

HussainAli Baraha, who had been deputy of Azim-ush-Shan in Bihar since 1708, and had clashed with

Farrukh Siyar on a number of points since his arrival at Patna, did not like the precipitate action of the

prince. When news arrived of the defeat and death of Azim-suh-Shan at Lahore, Husain Ali wanted to

draw back, but was persuaded by the Emperor’s mother not to do so since it would be of lasting infamy

for him. Promises of high office if Farrukh Siyar ascended the throne were also held out. However, the

relations between the two continued to be strained, Husain Ali being distrustful of Farrukh Siyar who

had earned a reputation for low-down cunning as he had earlier captured fort Rohtas by a farman and

assurance of safety to the commandant, but had violated the assurance after he had vacated the fort.

The combined armies of Farrukh Siyar and Husain Ali reached Allahabad by November, 1712 where

Abdullah Khan, the elder brother of Husain Ali, who had been Azim-ush-Shan’s deputy in the province

joined. Abdullah Khan soon became the chief person in the coalition, and used his influence to resolve

the prevailing ill-will between Husain Ali and Farrukh Siyar.

The victory of Farrukh Siyar at Agra (January, 1713) was entirely due to the efforts of the Saiyid Brothers.

Farrukh Siyar had, therefore, little option but to appoint Abdullah Khan as wazir and Husain Ali as Mir

Bakhshi. They were raised to the rank of 7000/7000, and granted governorships of Multan and Bihar

respectively and allowed to govern them through deputies. The maternal uncle of Abdullah Khan, Saiyid

Muzaffar Khan Baraha, was made governor of Ajmer, and a few relations and kinsmen of the Saiyids

admitted to mansabs. Apart from these, the Saiyids did not claim any special positions for their kinsmen.

In fact, they were keen to conciliate and win over old Alamgiri and Bahadur Shahi nobles. At the outset,

a general policy was laid down that all the Alamgiri nobles were to be confirmed in their previous ranks,

and all promotions of 300 and above in the zat rank given by Bahadur Shah were to be scrutinized. Chin

Qulich Khan was accorded the mansab of 7000/7000 and the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk and appointed

viceroy of the Deccan, with powers to select the lands to be allotted in jagir to him and to his followers,

and to suggest the mansabs to be granted to the chief zamindars there, i.e. Marathas and others.

Abdullah Khan used to say that he considered Nizam-ul-Mulk to be his “elder

473

brother”, and visited him and exchanged costly gifts before he left for the Deccan. Muhammad Amin

Khan, the cousin of Nizam-ul-Mulk, was made second bakhshi with the title of Itimad-ud-Daulah. Abdus

Samad Khan, who had been the chief lieutenant of Zulfiqar Khan in the civil wars at Lahore, was granted

the rank of 7000/7000, and appointed governor of Lahore. However, the efforts of the Saiyids to win the

old nobles to their side were only partially successful. Many of the old nobles were envious of the

Saiyids and looked down upon them as Hindustani upstarts.

The Saiyids also tried to follow a broad, liberal policy. Thus, while Farrukh Siyar was still in Bihar, at the

instance of Husain Ali, jizyah had been abolished. This order was reiterated six days after the defeat of

Jahandar Shah at Agra. Pilgrim tax levived at a number of places was abolished, and restrictions on the

Hindus using palkis and Arabi and Iraqi horses imposed by Aurangzeb and continued by Bahadur Shah,

were eased, and abolished altogether a few years later.

The Saiyids were also keen to conciliate the Rajputs. Thus, at their instance, Rana Sangram Singh II was

accorded a mansab of 7000/7000 with 8 crore dams in inam. Jai Singh and Ajit Singh sent letters of

congratulations to Farrukh Siyar, but avoided coming to pay personal allegience. Through their wakils

they reiterated their old demand for the grant of high mansabs and appointment to the subahs of

Malwa and Gujarat respectively. This was not to be liking of Farrukh Siyar who wanted to teach a lesson

to the Rajputs. He was particularly annoyed with Ajit Singh who had assasinated two sons of Indra Singh

who had been Mughal mansabdars. Jai Singh and Ajit Singh were raised to the rank of 7000/7000 but in

order to disrupt the alliance of the Rajput Rajas, Jai Singh was appointed as governor of Malwa, and Ajit

Singh to Thatta. Although Jai Singh moved towards Malwa, Ajit Singh refused to go to Thatta, and Husain

Ali was asked to lead an expedition against him.

Husain Ali led a large army against Ajit Singh early in January 1714. Meanwhile, relations between the

Saiyids and Farrukh Siyar had deteriorated to the point that Farrukh Siyar sent secret letters to Ajit Singh

promising rewards if he would defeat and kill the Mir Bakhshi. However, these moves were soon known

to Husain Ali who had kept close and cordial relations with the Rajput Rajas. After a few months of

474

campaigning, in which Husain Ali was assisted by a contingent of 4000 sawars sent by the Rana, a treaty

was patched up whereby Ajit Singh agreed to send his daughter in marriage to Farrukh Siyar, to send his

son Abhai Singh to the court with the Mir Bakhshi, to give peshkash and to accept appointment to

Thatta. According to a secret codicil, as soon as Ajit Singh marched a few stages towards Thatta to

demonstrate his loyalty, he would be appointed governor of Gujarat. Husain Ali personally issued a

rescript appointing Ajit Singh to Gujarat even without obtaining the formal approval of the Emperor.

First Trial of Strength between the Saiyids and Farrukh Siyar

In the absence of the Mir Bakshi, Abdullah Khan had found it difficult to maintain his position in the face

of opposition of the Emperor’s favourites, chiefly Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Dauran. Both of these had been

close to Farrukh Siyar, and although lacking any capacity or experience of high office, wanted to exercise

supreme power by ousting the Saiyids. Like Zulfiqar Khan earlier, the Saiyids wanted to keep all the

principal levers of power in their hands, and wanted that “no business should be transacted or mansabs

and appointments made without their advice and consultation.” (Khafi Khan) The favourite of the

Emperor, argued that the wazir and the Mir Bakhshi should recognize the limits of their power, and not

act without obtaining the approval and concurrence of the Emperor.

These two contradictory concepts of the nature of the wizarat resulted in a series of crises in which the

Saiyids steadily gained till they were powerful enough to displace Farrukh Siyar and to put their own

nominee on the throne. All issues became a subject to this struggle which also further aggravated the

crisis of the jagirdari system and strained the loyalty of the nobles to the Mughal throne.

The immediate cause of the crisis was the interference of the royal favourites in the wazir’s sphere of

administration. Farrukh Siyar authorized Mir Jumla to sign all papers on his behalf, declaring that “the

word and seal of Mir Jumla are my word and seal.” Mir Jumla started entertaining proposals for

mansabs and promotions and put the imperial seal without passing them through the office of the

diwan-i-wizarat. This was contrary to all rules of procedures, and also meant financial loss to the wazir,

depriving him of the perquisites for appointments.

475

Matters were worsened because Abdullah Khan who was primarily a soldier had left all affairs of state in

the hands of his deputy, Ratan Chand. Ratan Chand was not incompetent, but he was haughty and over bearing, and would do nothing without a suitable bribe for himself and his master, Abdullah Khan. Mir

Jumla refrained from these practices, and was also prompt in business.

Another factor which was a cause of complaint by Farrukh Siyar was Ratan Chand’s resort to ijara

(revenue farming). Even khalisa lands were farmed out. Whenever an amil was appointed, Ratan Chand

would take from him a contract or lease in writing and realize the money from his banker, i.e. one who

had stood surety for the contract. According to custom and tradition, ijara was considered ruinous and

Farrukh Siyar had forbidden it. However, ijara, which had become general under Jahandar Shah, was in

part a response to the growing breakdown in administration. The zamindars were withholding revenue,

and there was a famine at the beginning of Farrukh Siyar’s reign which afflicted the area around Delhi. In

the words of a contemporary, “the scarcity of food-grains reached a limit that nobody had ever seen or

heard in the past.”

Mir Jumla took advantage of these factors to impress upon Farrukh Siyar that the Saiyids were unfit for

high office, and that there would be no peace and prosperity in the empire as long as they had a hand in

the administration. He also accused them of being haughty and ease-loving and of lowering the

Emperor’s prestige by disregarding his authority.

Hoping to overawe the Saiyids and make them retire from their offices voluntarily, Farrukh Siyar began

to augment the military power of his favourites, Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Duaran. A number of their

relatives were also pushed forward till each of them had over 10,000 men at their command.

This was the situation which Husain Ali found on his return from Marwar. After due deliberations, the

Saiyids came to the conclusion that they would not be able to maintain their position at the court unless

they had the control and resources of one of the more important subahs. Hence, Husain Ali demanded

and secured for himself the post of Viceroy of the Deccan in place of Nizam-ul-Mulk. His intention was to

nominate a deputy like Zulfiqar Khan had done earlier and to remain at the court

476

himself. Farrukh Siyar and his favourites rightly objected that the combination of three such powerful

posts – the wazir, mir bakhshi, and viceroy of the Deccan in the hands of one family would be dangerous

and undesirable. Hence, Farrukh Siyar asked Husain Ali to proceed to the Deccan personally. He also

delayed issuing a farman appointing Ajit Singh as governor of Gujarat.

A crisis now developed. Fearing an attack by the Emperor’s supporters, the Saiyids retired to their

houses, and military preparations began on both sides. But the royal favourites, Mir Jumla and Khan-iDauran, shrank from measuring sword with the Saiyids because, in the words of a contemporary, they

“were only carpet knights, not true fighers”. An attempt was made to induce M. Amin Khan, the second

bakhshi and cousin of Nizam-ul-Mulk, to undertake the task. M. Amin Khan was willing but wanted the

wizarat in reward. The Emperor and his friends felt that it would be still more difficult to get rid of him

afterwards. Finally, a compromise was arrived at with the intervention of the Emperor’s mother. It was

agreed that Husain Ali would proceed to the Deccan to take personal charge of it. Mir Jumla who had

been appointed governor of Bihar and, perhaps also of Bengal, would also take personal charge of the

province. The Saiyids also agreed that one of the Emperor’s favourite, Khan-i-Dauran, be made acting

Mir Bakshi. Husain Ali left for the Deccan in the middle of May 1714. He carried with him the authority

to appoint and dismiss all jagirdars and office holders in the Deccan, as also the right to transfer

commandants of forts. These rights had previously been zealously held by the Emperor as his

prerogative. The transfer of these rights to the Viceroy of the Deccan must be considered the first step

in its detachment from the Empire.

As soon as Husain Ali’s back was turned, Farrukh Siyar sent secret instructions to Daud Khan Panni, then

governor of Gujarat, transferring him to Burhanpur, and asking him to resist Husain Ali. Daud Khan

reached Burhanpur by forced marches, and met Husain Ali on the field of battle. H usain Ali won easily

and obtained the secret letters sent to Daud Khan by Farrukh Siyar, thus giving the Saiyids further proof

of the duplicity of their master.

Final Crisis leading to the Deposition of Farrukh Siyar

477

Thus, the first trial of strength did not settle any issues. If anything, it made the Saiyids conscious of the

weakness of their position, and led them to busy themselves in recruiting allies wherever they could.

Farrukh Siyar turned to the old nobles, especially to the group consisting of M. Amin Khan, Nizam-ulMulk and their associates. He also tried to enlist Ajit Singh, Jai Singh, Maharaja Sangram II to his side.

Thus, at the instance of Jai Singh, Banswara, Dungarpur, etc. were once again placed under the

overlordship of the Rana. The Rana requested permission from Farrukh Siyar for helping his mother

making a pilgrimage to Garh Mukteshwar. In reply, Farrukh Siyar sent a gracious farman, assuring safe

conduct to the Maharana’s mother. Other concessions were also made to the Rana.

Although Jai Singh had been appointed governor of Malwa at the instance of the Saiyids, he had steadily

moved away from them. This was on account of the Saiyid intervention in the Kota-Bundi dispute

against Budh Singh, the protege and son-in-law of Jai Singh, and the Saiyid support to Churaman Jat who

was trying to carve out a principality on the brders of Amber, areas on which Jai Singh had his own eye.

Jai Singh’s ambitions had grown after he had gained a significant victory against the Marathas in 1714,

driving the Marathas across the Narmada at great loss. Also, as per tradition, he wanted to deal directly

with the Emperor rather than the wazir. In the middle of 1716, at the repeated and urgent summons of

Farrukh Siyar, Jai Singh appeared at the court. First, Bhim Singh was expelled from Bundi, and Budh

Singh was restored to it. Next, Jai Singh was nominated to lead an expedition against the Jats. Abdullah

Khan was not even consulted on the subject.

Meanwhile, the internal crisis deepened. Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri, who had worked under Aurangzeb,

but had gone to Mecca following the execution of his son, Sadullah Khan at the beginning of Farrukh

Siyar’s reign, returned. Farrukh Siyar who was now keen to win over the old Alamgiri nobles to his side,

appointed Inayatullah as diwan of tan (salaries) and khalisa. For some time, Inayatullah Khan worked

closely with the wazir, Abdullah Khan, but soon the two fell apart. At Inayatullah Khan’s instance, who

produced a letter from the Sharif of Mecca that the levying of jizyah on the non-Muslims was

“obligatory”, jizyah was reimposed, much to the displeasure of Abdullah Khan.

478

Inayatullah Khan next tried to tackle the problem of jagirs about which there was a growing

dissatisfaction among the khanzads i.e. the scions of the old nobles. He examined the salaries and the

yields of the jagirs, and proposed to set aside the mansabs of those who by force and cunning had

accumulated mansabs beyond their deserts laying their hands on the most productive jagirs. These were

identified as “Hindus and eunuchs and Kashmiris” and men of low ranks, whether of the diwani, or the

bakhshi, or the khan samani offices. In consequence, in the words of contemporary historians, Khafi

Khan and Mirza Muhammad, “there was a scarcity of jagirs for the others. People belonging to old

families had been reduced to the dust.”

The problem of shortage of jagirs and the dissatisfaction of the khanazads had become marked during

the latter years of Aurangzeb, and had steadily worsened, as we have seen. Hence, party struggle at the

court also revolved around the question of the grant of jagirs, specially the productive one

Since Ratan Chand had the support and backing of the subordinate officials of the administration, and of

Hindustani as distinct from the Turanis and Iranis, or the old nobles, he opposed these reforms, and at

his instance Abdullah Khan refused to implement them.

Meanwhile, after fourteen months of the close investment of the Jat stronghold, Thun, Jai Singh was

unable to gain a decisive victory. Abdullah Khan neogtiated a settlement with the Jat leader, Churaman,

over the head of Jai Singh. The Jat leader agreed to pay 50 lakhs of rupees in cash and goods to the

state, besides a private gift of 20 lakhs to the wazir. He also surrendered his strongholds, Thun, Dig etc.

In return, his mansab and his domination over many areas in the neighbourhood was tacitly a ccepted.

The agreement with Churaman was of doubtful benefit to the Saiyids. Churaman was a fair weather

friend, as they were to discover later. At Lahore, Churaman had been a partisan of Azim -ush-Shan, but

his role was to plunder. At Agra, he was with Jahandar Shah, but was the first to plunder when the tide

of battle turned against him. Further, the agreement made Jai Singh feel that he had been cheated of

success. This meant a definite rift between him and the Saiyids – something which the Saiyids regretted,

and tried to reverse later on but of little avail.

The Saiyids, however, gained a considerable advantage by

479

Husain Ali’s agreement.with Shahu. After his arrival in the Deccan, Husain Ali, following the policy of

Nizam-ul-Mulk, had refused to accept Daud Khan Panni’s agreement for payment of chauth and

sardeshmukhi of the Deccan to the Marathas in a lump sum. The result was a revival of the war with the

Marathas who appeared every where and plundered and devastated every place. The Marathas had

built small mud-forts (garhis) in each pargana to which they retired when pressed. It was impossible for

the imperialists to destroy these garhis. The matters were made still more difficult by the underhand

opposition of Farrukh Siyar, who wrote letters to Shahu and to zamindars and diwans in the Karnataka

to oppose Husain Ali. As a result Husain Ali’s authority in Bijapur, Haiderabad, and the Karnataka had

been “reduced almost to a cypher”. (Khafi Khan).

It was in these circumstances that in the middle of 1717, Husain Ali opened negotiations with Shahu

through Shankarji Malhar, who had worked under Shivaji and was a sachiv (minister) under Raja Ram

and after settling down at Banaras, and had joined Husain Ali at Delhi. After protracted negotiations, in

February 1718, an agreement was reached whereby Shahu was given the right to collect chauth and

sardeshmukhi in the Deccan through his own agents. He was also given the swarajya of Shivaji, and

recent Maratha conquest in Berar, Gondwana and the Karnataka were also confirmed to him. In return,

Shahu agreed to pay a peshkash of rupees ten lakhs, to maintain a body of 15,000 horse to be displaced

at the disposal of the Viceroy Deccan and to make the country populous and to punish malfectors. In

return for the grant of sardeshmukhi, Shahu agreed to pay over one crore rupees as customary fees.

Husain Ali granted sanads to Shahu in conformity with this agreement even without the approval of the

Emperor. When approached Farrukh Siyar rejected the agreement, arguing that “it was not proper for

the vile enemy (i.e. the Marathas) to be over-bearing partners in matters of revenue and government.”

The objection was valid, but Farrukh Siyar had brought the troubles on his head by his intrigues against

his erstwhile wazir and Mir Bakhshi. In desperation, to stem a likely move of Husain Ali against him,

Farrukh Siyar took a number of steps. M. Amin Khan, cousin of Nizamu-ul-Mulk and a leader of the

Turanis, was appointed to Malwa to help Jai Singh and check the “oppressors”, in reality to bar the path

of Husain Ali to Delhi.

480

Contrary to the agreementg with Husain Ali, a number of appointments were made to Burhanpur to

weaken Husain Ali’s hold over the area. Finally, he summoned to court Ajit Singh, Nizamum-ul-Mulk, and

Sarbuland Khan who was the Emperor’s maternal grand-uncle and was governor of Bihar and a noted

warrior. These old nobles were asked to come “with a large following”. It is estimated that the combined

strength of the various Rajas and nobles, and the personel following (walashahis) of the Emperor came

to 70 – 80,000 horse. Abdullah Khan had been continually adding to the soldiers at his disposal, every

time the Emperor went out on a hunt, and it was rumoured that it would be used as an occasion to

attack Abdullah Khan. However, his strength including Barahas and non-Barahas, is estimated to have

been between fifteen and thirty thousand men. Thus, Farrukh Siyar could have ousted the wazir if he

could have held this coalition together. But this did not happen because of the pusillanmity and shortsightedness of Farrukh Siyar, and his fear that if he ousted the Saiyids with the help of these powerful

nobles, it would be even more difficult to get rid of them afterwards. Hence, Farrukh Siyar chose for the

post of wazir a newly risen favourite, Muhammad Murad Kashmiri, who was rapidly raised to the rank of

7000/7000 and the best jagirs in the provinces of Gujarat, Delhi and Agra were allotted to him. By this

time, his old favourites Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Dauran had been discarded. Mir Jumla had totally failed in

Bihar, and come to Delhi without royal permission after having failed to pay his soldiers and controlling

the turbulent zamindars of the province. His mansab and jagirs had been resumed by Farrukh Siyar and

restored only at the intervention of Abdullah Khan. He was made sadr of Lahore with Abdullah Khan

backing. Khan-i-Dauran, it was suggested, was in secret league with the Saiyids and revealed to them all

the secret plots of the Emperor against them.

Muhammad Murad had a bad reputation for his association with young boys. The old nobles were

intensely jealous of his rise, and withdrew their support to Farrukh Siyar. Meanwhile, Abdullah Khan

won over Nizam-ul-Mulk and Sarbuland Khan by obtaining high offices for them. F.ven Ajit Singh was

alienated because Farukh Siyar removed him from Gujarat on a charge of oppression. Hence, on arrival

at court, Ajit Singh sided with the wazir.

481

Thus when Husain Ali left Aurangabad for Delhi towards the end of 1718 accompanied by 10,000

Maratha troops under the command of the Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath, Farrukh Siyar was completely

isolated, except for the support of Jai Singh. Husain Ali’s excuse for coming to Delhi was that he had

obtained a (fictitious) son of Prince Akbar from from Shahu and wanted to Hand him over to Farrukh

Siyar.

We need not go into the detailed events which led to the deposition of Farrukh Siyar in February 1719,

and his assasination in captivity a few months later. In the deposition, Husain Ali was supported by M.

Amin Khan and Ajit Singh. Even Khan-i-Dauran favoured it. On the other hand, Abdullah Khan was of the

opinion that since the fort was completely under the control of the Saiyids’ men, and all posts close to

the Emperor were held by their nominees, or were to be handed over to them soon, there would be no

harm in keeping Farrukh Siyar on the throne. However, public opinion in the city was restive, and in the

process 2,000 Marathas troopers had been killed, and the rest compelled to leave town. Jai Singh was

loitering 20 kos from Delhi with 20,000 horsemen, and if some of the nobles in the city joined, it would

be hard to control the situation. Meanwhile, Farrukh Siyar delayed handing over to the nominees of the

Saiyids all the posts demanded by them.

Whatever the problems, the deposition and subsequent assassination of Farrukh Siyar was both a

mistake and a crime from which the Saiyids could never recover. From being looked upon as brave

individuals, who were fighting against an ungrateful mas ter for the preservation of their lives and

honour, after the deposition they began to be looked upon as tyrants and traitors to the salt. It also

cleared the way for the “Chin” group of Turani nobles to stand forth as champions of the Timurid

monarchy and the faith which was in danger of being subverted.

The Saiyid “New” Wizarat

After deposing Farrukh Siyar, the Saiyids set up a new monarch, the 20 year old Rafi-ud-Darjat. However,

he was consumptive and died after four months. He was succeeded by his brother, Rafi-ud-Daulah, who

also succumbed to the same disease in three months time. This showed the inability of the Saiyids to

persuade most of the royal princes to accept their offer of kingship. During the seven months rule of

these two princes, the

482

Saiyids reserved for their nominees all the posts, such as Daroghas of the Diwan-i-Khas or the

Ghusalkhana, or the Superintendent of the haram. Even the eunuchs and personal attendants of the

rulers were hand-picked by the Saiyids. Saiyid Himmat Khan Baraha was appointed the guardian of the

Emperor, and it was said that without his orders, the Emperor could not even be served with food! Thus,

the Emperor lost all personal liberty. After the accession of Muhammad Shah, the grandson of Bahadur

Shah, the hereditary door-keepers and attendants etc. were allowed to return to their former posts. But

in all matters of state the Emperor continued to be powerless.

Apart from the posts which gave access to the Emperor, the Saiyids made as few changes as possible.

Thus, in the provinces most of the previous governors and office-holders were continued. At the court,

except for some of the disreputed favourites of Farrukh Siyar, such as Muhammad Murad Kashmiri and

a few others, most of the others, including Khan-i-Dauran and Mir Jumla, were not deprived of their

mansabs and jagirs and given employment. In general, the Saiyids made no effort to monopolize high

offices of state. Thus, M. Amin Khan continued to be the second bakhshi; another Turani

Roshanuddaulah Zafar Khan was made third bakhshi, and even Inayatullah Khan whose proposed

reforms had angered Abdullah Khan was continued as Khan-i-Saman, and as the absentee governor of

Kashmir. Apart from the posts of wazir, Mir Bakhshi and Viceroyalty of the Deccan which the Saiyids

considered theirs by right, the only new posts given to the Barahas, or dependents of the Saiyids were

the governorships of Agra and Allahabad, and the faujdari of Moradabad – all areas of strategic

importance.

Despite their concilatory policies, two centres of resistance to the Saiyids developed at Agra and

Allahabad. At Agra, an adventurer named Mitr Sen, and some of his associates, proclaimed a rebel

prince, Neku Siyar, as Emperor. The Allahabad rebellion was led by Chhabela Ram, a protege of Farrukh

Siyar. The Saiyids were afraid that Neku Siyar might become a rallying point for all their opponents.

Rumors were rife that Nizam-ul-Mulk who had been appointed governor of Malwa, Chhabela Ram and

Jai Singh were coming to the aid of Neku Siyar. However, he did not receive any support from the old

nobles, and the Saiyids were able to crush his rebellion soon. The

483

rebellion at Allahabad proved to be more protracted. Ultimately, at the threat of Husain Ali’s personal

intervention, Chhabela Ram’s nephew, Girdhar Bahadur, agreed to vacate the fort in return of the grant

of governorship of Awadh and all the jagirs including some of the important faujdaris, and rupees thirty

lakhs in cash. These terms, and the fact that it took fourteen months to deal with these two rebellions,

showed the limitations of the power and support of the Saiyids: their subordinates were not

experienced and powerful enough, and the Saiyids were themselves loth to leave the capital.

The Saiyids continued their earlier policy of consolidating their alliance with the Rajputs and the

Marathas, and to appease Hindu opinion as far as possible. Immediately after the deposition of Farrukh

Siyar, jizyah was abolished once again, credit for it being given to Ajit Singh. As a further gesture of

goodwill, Ajit Singh’s daughter who had been converted to Islam before being married to Farrukh Siyar,

was allowed to renounce her new faith and return to her home, taking all her wealth and property with

her. The Saiyids ignored the opposition to this step by the qazis whao argued that renunciation of Islam

was illegal.

Through Ajit Singh, the Saiyids also tried to win over Jai Singh and Maharana Sangram Singh II. With the

help and backing of the Rana, and a number of disaffected nobles who had resorted to Amber, Jai Singh

had moved to Toda Bhim, 80 kos from Agra, watching the situation there. After the fall of Agra, and

under the threat of an invasion of his territory, Jai Singh withdrew from Toda Bhim. In an effort to

appease Jai Singh, he was granted the important faujdari of Sorath in Gujarat and granted a large sum of

money. Ajit Singh was granted the subah of Ajmer along with Gujarat. The two Rajput rajas, who had the

support of the Rana of Mewar, formed a powerful group which could have played a decisive role. The

returning confidence of the Hindus is reflected in Khafi Khan’s “complaint” that “from the environs of

the capital to the banks of the Narabada, the infidels were engaged in repairing temples and attempting

to forbid cow-slaughter.”

The pact with the Marathas was strengthened by the formal Imperial grant of chauth and sardeshmukhi

of the Deccan which Balaji Vishwanath took, along with some members of Shahu’s family who had been

in captivity. Although no Maratha troops remained in the North, Alam Ali, Husain Ali’s deputy in the

484

Deccan, was instructed to follow the advice of Shankarji Malhar in all matters as the latter had close

connections with Shahu.

Churaman Jat was also appeased by being given charge of the royal highway between Delhi and

Gwaliyar, and other concessions. In return, Churaman sided with the Saiyids in the siege of Agra.

Despite the sullenness of a large section of the nobles, and the underhand opposition of the Turanis, the

Saiyids might have been able to consolidate their position given time, and if differences about power,

policies and pelf had not risen between the two brothers. Thus, differences arose between the brothers

regarding the spoils from the fort at Delhi after the deposition of Farrukh Siyar which had been seized by

Abdullah Khan, and the bulk of the treasures at Agra estimated to be two to three crores had been

seized by Husain Ali after the fall of Neku Siyar. Ratan Chand managed to evolve a compromise by

pointing to the “Turani” danger though neither side was satisfied. There was also a subtle struggle for

power between the brothers. Husain Ali was much more energetic than Abdullah Khan, and he rapidly

out-classed the latter in the exercise of real power. But Husain Ali was of a hot and hasty temperament

and failed to weigh the situation carefully before coming to a decision. As Khafi Khan says “He (Husain

Ali) deemed himself superior in military and government matters to his brother, though he was forgetful

of the real matter, and unacquainted with stratagem.”

Aware of the importance of the old nobles, especially of Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Chin group, Abdullah

Khan had paid special attention to this group. He used to say, “We are three brothers of whom Niazm-

ul-Mulk is the eldest, and Husain Ali the youngest.” In a latter to Nizam-ul-Mulk, Abdullah Khan

explained his policy in the following words:

“The high and mighty task of administering Hindustan is not one that can be accomplished single handed, without the help of prominent nobles and officers of state. Under the circumstances, is it better

that I should bring forwaqrd new (untried) men and become dependent on them, or that I should

continue to take the help of one like you who has ever been a friend?” However, careful not to allow

Nizam-ul-Mulk to become too powerful, Abdullah Khan wanted to appoint him as governor of Bihar

which had notoriously turbulent zamindars, and yielded little money. But Husain Ali, confident of the

position of his deputy,

485

S.Alam Ali in the Deccan and his own position in the North, insisted on sending Nizam-ul-Mulk to Malwa.

Nizam accepted on the promise that it would not be transferred from him soon. He also refused to leave

his son behind at the court as his wakil, despite repeated requests from the Saiyid. He was accompanied

to Malwa by more than one thousand mansabdars who also took their families with them.

Thus, a show-down between the ‘Chin’ group led by Nizam-uI-Mulk, and the Saiyids appeared

inescapable. Husain Ali precipitated matters by transferring Nizam from Malwa, offering him Agra,

Allahabad, Burhanpur or Multan, whichever he chose. The Saiyids had been receiving news that Nizamul-Mulk had been collecting men and materials of war in excess of his requirements as the governor, and

that he had his eyes on the Deccan. Nizam justified these by pointing to the depredations of the

Marathas who were harrying the province with 50,000 horses. Dissatisfied, Husain Ali had instructed his

bakhshi, S. Dilawar Ali, who had been deputed with a strong force to deal with a dispute in Kotah-Bundi

to keep a watch on the Malwa border. After issuing orders for the transfer of Nizam from Malwa,

Dilawar Ali was asked to be alert, and letters were sent to S. Alam Ali to be vigilant in the Deccan. Having

taken these precautions, the Saiyids sent a mace-bearer to escort Nizam-ul-Mulk to the court.

There is little doubt that the Saiyids over-estimated their power in throwing the gauntlet to Nizam-ulMulk. The latter had been warned by his cousin, M. Amin, that the Saiyids intended to move against him

after the conclusion of Girdhar Bahadur’s rebellion at Allahabad. He had also received messages from

the Emperor and from the Queen Mother asking him to liberate them from the grip of the Saiy ids.

Hence, Nizam-ul-Mulk was fully prepared. He disregarded the orders for recall to the Court, and crossed

the Narmada into the Deccan where he was immediately joined by the governors of Khandesh and

Berar. Many other nobles including many of those considered close to the Saiyids also threw in their lot

with Nizam-ul-Mulk who sedulously preached that whatever he was doing was for the prestige of the

royal house, the Saiyids having decided to subvert the Timurid dynasty; that the Saiyids were

determined to ruin and disgrace all Irani and Turani families beginning with

486

his destruction, and that the Saiyids were allied with the Hindus and were pursuing policies which were

anti-Islamic and detrimental to the Empire.

Thus, defence of king, race, religion and empire were the slogans raised by Nizam-ul-Mulk which the

Saiyids found difficult to counter. Last minute efforts by Abdullah Khan to conciliate Nizam by granting

him the Viceroyalty of the Deccan were not productive and not acceptable to Husain Ali. Even more

disastrous was the decision of the Saiyids to divide their forces, with Husain Ali leading an army to the

Deccan, taking the Emperor with him. Earlier, Nizam had defeated Alam Ali who had been joined by a

force of 15 – 16,000 Marathas led by Balaji Vishwanath. Nizam had then turned north, and defeated

Dilawar Ali Khan. Before Husain Ali could confront Nizam-ul-Mulk, he was assassinated in a conspiracy

hatched by Haidar Quli Khan, the Mir Atish, helped by M. Amin Khan and others. Efforts of Abdullah

Khan to raise a new puppet, and gather a new army proved futile. He was defeated near Delhi by M.

Amin Khan and Emperor Muhammad Shah in November, 1720.

Thus ended the “new” wizarat of the Saiyids which lasted less than two years. The effort of the Saiyids,

to make the wizarat the hub of affairs, and to tread their way back to the type of liberal, inclusive state

associated with Akbar was a significant step. It failed, partly due to the narrow social base of the

Barahas, but even more to the deep divisions among the nobility, and the strong desire of the old

nobles, the Mughals, who considered themselves the upholders of the dynasty and the empire, not to

allow power to pass into the hands of the despised Hindustanis. The growing shortage of productive

jagirs, and the growing turbulence of the zamindars heightened party strife. The Saiyids also made a

number of political mistakes including their internal discord which hastened their downfall.

The Wizarat of Muhammad Amin & Nizam-ul-Mulk

After the fall of the Saiyids, M. Amin Khan was made wazir with the title of Itimad-ud-Daulah, and a

mansab of 8000-8000 du-aspa, sih-aspa, and the absentee governorship of Multan. His son, Qamaruddin

Khan, was appointed second bakhshi with the rank of 7000 and the faujdari of Moradabad which was as

large as a subah. He was also made darogha of the Ghusalkhana which regulated access to the Emperor,

and darogha of the Ahadis

487

(gentlemen trooper). Khan-i-Dauran was made chief Bakhshi, and Saadat Khan who had taken part in

the conspiracy against Husain Ali was rewarded with the governorship of Awadh. Abdus Samad Khan

retained Lahore, with the addition of Kashmir in the name of his son. Muhammad Amin continued the

Saiyids policy to make the wazir the real hub of affairs, and of trying to win the support of Rajputs,

Marathas and the Hindus generally. Thus, Muhammad Amin Khan, showed no inclination to relax the

wazir’s control over the Emperor. According to a contemporary, Warid, the only share of Muhammad

Shah was to sit on the throne and to wear the crown. The Emperor was afraid of the wazir and gave him

full authority.

A proposal to revive jizyah was abandoned due to the opposition of Raja Jai Singh and Raja Girdhar

Bahadur. The agreement made with the Marathas for the grant of chauth and sardeshmukhi of the

Deccan was confirmed by the grant of fresh sanads, something to which Nizam-ul-Mulk had also agreed

to in a secret meeting with Peshwa Baji Rao soon after the downfall of the Saiayids. Ajit Singh was

removed from Gujarat due to his mal-administration, but the wazir was suspected of wanting his

restoration to either Gujarat or Ajmer,

However, Muhammad Amin Khan died after a year and three months (Jan. 1721). The way was now

open for the assumption of wizarat by Nizam-ul-Mulk. Nizam-ul-Mulk did not show any eagerness to

assume the office, and even after the receipt of royal summons went to the Karnataka in order to settle

the affairs there. Appearing at Delhi in February 1722, almost a year after the death of Muhammad

Amin, Nizam-ul-Mulk found that the administration had deteriorated and made worse due to factional

strife at the court. It soon became apparent that Nizam’s real interest was to hold on to the Deccan and,

if possible, to retain Malwa and to add Gujarat to it. He nce, he had Gujarat transferred to his son,

Ghaziuddin Khan, and moved towards Gujarat with a large army to oust the existing incumbent, Haider

Quli Khan. On the way, he met Baji Rao, a second time near Jhabua in Malwa. Baji Rao had invaded

Malwa with a large force. In the Deccan, Mubariz Khan, Nizam-ul-Mulk’s deputy, had repudiated the

treaty for the grant of chauth and sardeshmukhi with the Marathas. The secret accord between Nizam ul-Mulk and Baji Rao shows that Nizam-ul-Mulk’s tirade

488

against the Marathas and the Rajputs was subject to modification when it suited his interests.

After ousting Haider Quli from Gujarat, Nizam returned Delhi. Nizam now put forward a scheme of

reforms of the administration. Its main emphasis was that only fit nobles and soldiers should be

employed, as in the time of Aurangzeb; that the jagirs should be redistributed and khalisa lands given in

jagir should be resumed. He also wanted a ban on farming of crown-lands, and denounced bribe taking.

He wanted the restoration of jizyah as in the time of Aurangzeb.

Nizam-ul-Mulk’s hope of rallying the old nobles to his side in this manner was not very successful. The

new nobles, including the Hindustanis who were entrenched in the administration, were strongly

opposed to any review of the jagir holdings. They seized upon Nizam’s proposal for the revival of jizyah,

denouncing it as “inopportune”. Even Abdus Samad Khan, governor of Lahore, who was related to

Nizam, opposed the revival of jizyah.

It is not clear how sincere Nizam-ul-Mulk was for implementing his scheme of reforms. Towards the end

of 1723, he left for his jagir in Moradabad for “a change of air”, but moved towards Malwa on hearing of

renewed Maratha incursions into that rich and strategically placed province.

On his way to Malwa, Nizam-ul-Mulk heard the news that he had been superseded in the Viceroyalty of

the Deccan by his deputy, Mubariz Khan. Efforts were also made by the Emperor to enlist Shahu, and

some of the leading Maratha sardars against Nizam.

In October, 1724, in a battle at Shakar Khera, Nizam-ul-Mulk defeated Mubariz Khan with the aid of

Maratha troops led by Baji Rao,From this battle may be dated the de facto independence of Haiderabad.

The break up of the Mughal empire had begun. The defenders of the dynasty and of the empire had

turned around fully and became the chief instruments of their destruction.

Rise of Regional States and Foreign Invasions of India (1725-48)

The decade following the departure of Nizam-ul-Mulk from the court and his establishment as a semiindependent ruler in the Deccan, saw a rapid shrinkage of the area under the direct control of the

Mughal Emperor. In Bengal, Murshid Quli Khan had been effectively in charge since 1703. Efforts to

remove him

489

from Bengal had failed, and from 1710 he was in effective charge of Bengal, and Orissa. Bihar was added

to his charge later on. His son-in-law, Shujaat Khan, succeeded him in 1727. In Awadh, Saadat Khan was

appointed governor in 1723, and proclaimed his de facto independence when in 1726 he refused to be

transferred to Malwa. He was succeeded by his son-in-law, Safdar Jung, in 1739. In Punjab, Abdus

Samad Khan got the governorship in 1713 and was succeeded by his son, Zakariya Khan.

The diememberment of the Empire by the emergence of these states did not adversely effect the

political and economic development of the areas because in each case the governors who took charge

were exceptionally able persons who were able to govern their domains effectively on the whole. They

also maintained the outward sanctity of the Imperial crown by paying formal allegience to the Emperor,

and securing his formal approval to the succession by gifts etc. However, the rise of the Ruhelas in the

north west of Awadh, and of the continued though covert opposition of the Jats in the Agra – Mathura

region, and of the Sikhs in the Punjab created difficulties and led to the rise of new independent states

or sub-states.

The biggest danger to all these states, however, was the growing power and sweep of the Marathas. The

foreign danger also appeared in 1739 in the shape of Nadir Shah. Although Ahmad Shah Abdali was

defeated in 1748, it was not long before Punjab and areas upto Agra and beyond became subject to

recurrent foreign invasions, while the English established themselves in Bengal.

During this period, the Mughal court remained supine, and subject to factionalism. Although

Muhammad Shah had been freed from the thraldom of the wazir with the departure of Nizam-ul-Mulk

from the Court, he showed little capacity for governance and administration, though all the outer

routine of court life set up by Akbar and the established forms of government were continued.

Muhammad Shah never led a military campaign during his twenty-nine years of reign, even his

excursions being confined to visiting the gardens in the neighbourhood, and occasionally to see the

annual festivals of Garh Mukteshwar. He was, however, liberal in his religious views, and freely

participated in the festivals of Holi, Dasera, etc.

Unfortunately, he chose as his main advisors not men who

490

were energetic and capable commanders, but carpet knights who were adept in witty conversation and

were soft in their behaviour. Thus, he chose as wazir Qamaruddin Khan who was slothful and a

drunkard, and as Mir Bakhshi Khan-i-Dauran, a Hindustani who had never led a campaign. As a

contemporary, Warid, says,”… Emperor and wazir alike lived in total forgetfulness of the business of the

administration, the collection of the revenue, and the needs of the army.” The noted historian Jadunath

Sarkar says: “With a foolish, idle and fickle master on the throne, the nobles began to give free play to

the worst forms of selfishness.” Bribery became rampant, and jagirs were freely sold. The leading role in

this was played by Kukijiu, daughter of a geomancer who had predicted the succession of Muhammad

Shah to the throne, and a holy man, Abdul Ghafur who claimed magical powers. These were joined by

Roshanuddaulah Zafar Khan Panipati, the third bakhshi. This group enriched itself by means of presents

made at the time of appointment or grant of jagirs, and shared their proceeds with the Emperor.

Although this gang fell from power in 1732-33, administration did not improve, the smaller mansabdars

suffering the most. They found it almost impossible to collect their dues from their jagirs on account of

the growing lawlessness. The growing distancing of the nobles from the Emperor, and lack of money to

pay the army left the Empire a hallow trunk.

It was in this situation that a new danger arose in the north-west in the shape of Nadir Shah. The Safavid

empire had entered into a state of decline from the second half of the seventeenth century. In 1709, the

Ghilzai Chief, Mir Waiz, rose against the Persians and seized Qandahar fort. In 1722, his son deposed the

Safavid monarch, and had himself crowned. Iran now came under the domination of the Afghans, while

the Ottomon Turks and Russia seized the opportunity to capture the western and northern parts of Iran.

Nadir Quli Beg, later Nadir Shah, rose to power by leading a Persian war of national resistance against

the Afghans. By 1730, Nadir had expelled the Ghilzais from the heart of Persia, and also captured Herat

from the Abdalis. He then turned against the Ottomons. In a series of campaigns he ousted the them

from the western part of Iran, but failed to recapture Baghdad. Exhaustion forced the two sides to

conclude a truce in 1736. Having gained his reputation as an intrepid commander, and gathering a band

491

of faithful followers, Nadir had no difficulty in ousting the Safavid ruler who was a minor, and ascending

the throne in 1737.

The Delhi court watched these developments in a mood of benign neglect. For Nadir Shah the invasion

of India was a logical step after the expulsion of the Ghilzais and Abdalis from Persia, and the stalemate

in the war with the Ottomon Turks. It was only from India that he could replenish his treasury for a

renewal of the war against the Ottomans. The weakness of the Delhi government was also no secret

after the set backs they had suffered in Malwa and Gujarat at the hands of the Marathas, and the

appearance of a Maratha army outside Delhi in 1737.

The Mughals had tried to safeguard India from an invasion from the north-west by using diplomatic

means to see that a combination of powers hostile to India did not arise in West Asia, by maintaining a

strong administration at Kabul and if possible, keeping control of Qandahar. Kabul and Qandahar were

considered the two gateways to India. The Mughals also sought to control the Afghan tribesmen by

giving economic subsidies to the tribesmen and by employing them in their armies.

When Nizam-ul-Mulk was at Delhi in 1724, he vaguely talked of leading a campaign to Isfahan to restore

the Safavids with whom the Mughals had an old tradition of friendship despite clash over the control of

Qandahar. But the Court had neither the power nor the desire to do so. Instead, it sought to establish

friendly relations with the Ghilzai chief, Mahmud, by an exchange of letters.

As early as 1730, Nadir Shah had sent an embassy to Muhammad Shah, announcing his intention to

march on Qandahar. Recalling old ties of friendship between the two countries, and their common

interest in dealing with the Afghans, he asked the Emperor to close the frontier to all Afghan refugees

once the operations had begun. Muhammad Shah replied that the subahdars of Kabul and Sindh were

being instructed to comply, and that the Kabul army would be reinforced for the purpose.

However, instead of attacking Qandahar, Nadir Shah turned his attention to the tussle with Turkey, and

the Mughal court became engrossed with the threat posed by the Marathas in Malwa and Gujarat, and

forgot about the north-west.